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Directed by:
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This study attempts a systematic philosophical analysis
of various metaethical theories advanced by prominent Chinese

political philosophers in answer to the question whether it
is possible to demonstrate that certain basic principles of

political ethics are objectively either true or false, inde-

pendently of subjective moral commitments, and if so, by

what method.

Like their counterparts in the West, Chinese

political philosophers have given various, and often conflicting, answers to this question.

The principal objective of this study is, not to make
an original contribution to metaethics, nor to give a his-

torical account of the development of these political philosophies, but to provide an analytical interpretation and

vii

a critical understanding of different
Chinese political phi-

losophies which are often grouped under
Confucianism, NeoConfucianism, Moism, Taoism, Legalism, Socialism,
and

muni sm 0

Corn-

Various answers to the question are illustrated
by

the works representing these schools of thought.

But they

are organized, not historically, but systematically.
I

have tried to give an accurate presentation of these

various political philosophies, but

X

have not confined my-

self to the presentation of a summary of these philosophies.
I

am convinced that only one of these conflicting views is

correct, and I have stated my criticisms of all others, in
the belief that they will perhaps serve to stimulate further

discussions among the students of Chinese political philoso-

phy and thereby indirectly help to increase our understanding
of this crucial problem.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

A#

Statement of the Problem

Is it possible to demonstrate that
certain basic prin-

ciples of political ethics are objectively
either true or
false, independently of subjective moral
commitments, and
if so, by what method?

er

s

Or are they expressions of the speak-

subjective moral attitude, preference or commitment

which cannot be either true or false?

These are enduring

questions in the metaethics of politics which many Chinese

no less than Western political philosophers have attempted
to answer, explicitly or implicitly.

They are questions, not

of normative ethics, but of metaethics of politics or philos-

ophy of political ethics because they deal with moral principles of politics, not directly, but as an object of phil-

osophical analysis.

H

Meta-ethics does not propound any moral

principles or goals for action, except possibly by implication; it consists entirely of philosophical analysis.
In spite of their importance in philosophical inquiries

and in spite of the impressive strides made by analytic phi-

2

losophy in the last several decades,
there is no systematic
analysis of the answers provided by major
Chinese political
thinkers, either in English or in Chinese.

Among the grow-

ing literature on Chinese philosophy, there are
two books

by prominent twentieth century Chinese philosophers
whose

titles suggest that they may cover the subject.
does.

But neither

One of them. The Development of the Logical Method
in

Ancient China by Hu Shih has little to say about the above

problem . 2

The other. Intellectual Intuition and Chinese

Philosophy (in Chinese) by Mou Tsung-san deals almost exclusively with the met aphysics of Immanuel Kant and some Chinese

philosophers, though the author promises in his preface to

open a new frontier in met aethics o

Even in a monumental

work like the eight- volume Encyclopedia of Philosophy

,

which

deals with the philosophies of more than fifteen Chinese

philosophers, one cannot find a careful analysis of the com-

peting theories advanced by some of them in answer to these
questions.

The absence of such an analysis in the Encyclo -

pedia which examines in detail the metaethical problems of

Western philosophers is perhaps not an oversight of its editor or an accidental omission on the part of its contributors.

3

It seems to be a reflection of the
lack of interest of

scholars in Chinese philosophy and the state
of scholarship
in this particular area.

I

therefore propose to attempt,

for the first time as far as I can ascertain
from my re-

search, a systematic analysis of the answers advanced
by

various Chinese political thinkers.

B.

The Nature of the Proposed Analysis

The theories which

I

shall examine do not belong to

normative ethics, for they do not advocate specific moral
principles of politics.

These theories deal with the cog-

nitive status of these normative principles, that is, whether
and how these normative principles of politics can be shown
to be objectively true or false.

They therefore belong to

metaethics of politics in general and to epistemology of
political ethics in particular.
In their attempt to answer this epistemological ques-

tion, many moral philosophers have found it necessary to

deal, explicitly or implicitly, with one or more of the fol-

lowing problems in metaethics

i

(1) The

meaning of value

4

terms such as 'good' and 'evil' and of
moral terms such as

right

and 'wrong'.

nonnatural
speaker

s

Do they stand for some "natural" or

properties?

Or do they function to express the

moral attitude toward, or his commendation or con-

demnation of, a certain kind of action or state of affairs?
(2)

The nature and function of ethical statements in
which

these and similar ethical terms occur.
a subclass of factual statements?

Are moral statements

Or do they perform a func-

tion drastically different from factual statements?

criteria of validity of ethical judgments.

(3) The

Can ethical judg-

ments be justified in any objective way similar to those in

which factual judgments can be justified?
be shown to be valid by some other methods?

If not, can they

The answers each

philosopher gives to these questions will determine into which
of the metaethical schools he should be classified.

Co

Some Difficulties

This proposed attempt will not be an easy one.

First

of all, being the first attempt in the area of Chinese polit

ical philosophy, I am forced, in a sense, to wander in the

5

dark with little, if any, guiding light.

There is no exist-

ing work on Chinese political philosophy
which may serve as
a guide to this study.

Secondly, to find out the answers

given by Chinese thinkers, it is necessary to read the
unindexed, and often voluminous, collections of original works.

these works in most cases fail to separate empirical,

ethical, metaethical, and metaphysical arguments.

Since most

of their answers were not set forth in methodical philosophi-

cal treatises and their metaethical views were often far from

unequivocal, one of the main tasks of this study is the inter-

pretation of their views in the light of modern metaethical
categories.

As students of political philosophy are well

aware, it is not easy to interpret even Western political

philosophies, especially of the past, in the language of modern analytic philosophy and place them into the various meta-

ethical categories

I

shall mention.

For example, Thomas

Hobbes' writings contain many passage which, taken by themselves, would classify him into each of the three metaethical

categories.

He may be classified as an intuitionist because

he spoke of natural law in the following terms:

4

6

6

A law of nature, lex naturalis

is a precept or
general rule, found out by reason, by which
a man
is forbidden to do that which is
destructive of
life, or taketh away the means of preserving
the same; and to omit that by which he thinketh
it
may be best preserved.
.

He appears to take a naturalist view when he
asserts

that "all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way, or means of peace.. .are good; that is to
say, moral virtues ; and their contrary vices , evil.

Now the

science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy; and therefore
the true doctrine of the laws of nature, is the true moral

philosophy.

Hobbes, however, contradicts these cognitivist

views and affirms the metaethics of noncognitivism in the
following passage:

But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite
or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth
good ; and the object of his hate and aversion. evil
and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable . For
these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are
ever used with relation to the person that useth
them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so;
nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken
from the nature of the objects themselves.
;

The writings of John Stuart Mill present a similar

problem.

As an exponent of the definist theory that 'good'

^

?
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means 'happiness' and 'x is desirable' means
the same as

x is desired'

,

Mill must be classified as a cognitivist.

His cognitivist view is brought out in statements
such asi

The only proof capable of being given that an
object is visible, is that people actually see
it* • o • In like manner, I apprehend, the sole
evidence it is possible to produce that anything
is desirable, is that people do actually desire
it...* No reason can be given why the general
happiness is desirable except that each person,
so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness* This, however, being
a fact, we have not only all the proof which the
case admits of, but all which it is possible to
require, that happiness is a good: that each
person's happiness is a good to that person, and
the general happiness, therefore, a good to the
aggregate of all persons.

But as pointed out by Felix E 0 Oppenheim, Mill "comes
at least close to taking the noncognitivist position" when

he asserts that "questions of ultimate ends are not amenable
to direct proof.

Whatever can be proven to be good, must

be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to
be good without proof," and that "the method ... of ethics

can be no other than that of art," as distinguished from
science.
It is even more difficult to interpret and classify

8

Chinese political philosophies, especially
the pre-modem
ones this way, without risking the accusation
of placing

them in a

modem Procrustean

bed.

I

do not wish to minimize

the difficulties involved in such an undertaking.

It cannot

be denied that the linguistic and cultural differences
be-

tween East and West are indeed great and that Chinese political philosophers rarely think and speak in terms which are

familiar to the students of modern analytic philosophy.

To recognize these differences and difficulties, however,
is not to subscribe to the thesis that it is impossible to

classify various political philosophies of Chinese thinkers
into modern metaethical categories or that it is futile to

apply the methods of modern analytical philosophy to the
study of Chinese political philosophy.

While it is true that

the metaethical theory of any well-known Chinese political

philosopher differ from that of any great Western political
philosopher in some respects, it is false to conclude that
they are unique in all respects.

For example, it cannot be

denied that there are some Chinese political philosophers
who, like some of their counterparts in the West, maintain

that certain basic principles of political ethics can be

9

imown to be objectively true or false on
the basis of moral
insight.

Similarly, there are political philosophers
in

China as well as in the West who claim that
normative principles oc politics can be derived from factual generalizations.

For the purpose of this study, these similarities

are significant because they are relevant to the question

whether and how basic normative principles of politics can
be shown to be objectively true or false.

Moreover, I believe it is well worthwhile to apply the

concepts of modern analytical philosophy to the study of
Chinese political philosophy because they are in my judgment

excellent tools for arriving at an analytical understanding,
a critical assessment, and a comparative perspective of dif-

ferent systems of Chinese political philosophy.
It might be objected that the language used by some

Chinese philosophers does not distinguish explicitly 'is'
and 'ought'.

The reply is that if we apply these modern

metaethical concepts we must make this distinction regardless
of the actual language used by them.

10

D*

Original Works and Translations

I.fo e

In the long history of Chinese
political philosophy,

many Chinese political thinkers have advanced
various answers to the question of this study.

It is however impos-

sible for a study of this nature to include all
"great”

political philosophers.

In the selection of the works of

Chinese political thinkers to be discussed, I have been

guided by two considerations.

First, the works must provide

explicit, or at least implicit, arguments for one or the
other of the alternative metaethical views.
this reason that

I

And it is for

shall not consider the philosophy of

Confucius even though it has influenced many of the philoso-

phers covered in this study.

The only reliable source of

his philosophy, the Analects of Confucius , contains few

metaethical arguments which are relevant to the topic of
this study. Second, these works must be widely known to the

educated Chinese in general and to the students of Chinese

political philosophy in particular.

In fact, many of the

works cited in this study were, and some still are, required

readings at various levels of Chinese education.

Some of

11

the ethical and metaethical
doctrines contained therein re-

ceived the official blessing when they
were regarded as correct theories in such competitive public
examinations as the
college entrance examination or the civil service
examination.
ing;,

For example, the Book of Mencius and the Great Learn -

together with other Confucian Classics, were the basis

of the civil service examinations from 1313 to 1905.

The

influence of Chu Hsi's political philosophy is exemplified

by the fact that in 1313 an imperial decree ordered that his
and Ch'eng

I* s

commentaries on the Four Books and the Five

Classics be the standard official interpretations and the
basis for the civil service examinations.

Min Chu

I or the

Sun Yat-sen's San

Three Principles of the People is a required

reading at colleges and universities in the Republic of China
and is a subject in its civil service examinations.

In the

People's Republic of China almost everyone who can read is
expected, if not required, to study a certain portion of the

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung .

A further difficulty is that the authenticity of some
ancient texts used in this study has been challenged by many
scholars.

I

have spent an enormous amount of time reading
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contradictory arguments on this matter, but
have decided
against making any reference to them in order
to save space
and to avoid distraction from the main issue
of this inquiry.
For the purposes of this study, it is not of vital
importance
to decide (if it can be decided at all) whether a work
at-

tributed to a thinker is in fact his own work.

I

maintain

in this study that a certain metaethical view is expressed

in a book that bears the name of a thinker or in a book at-

tributed to him.

However,

I

shall not make use of any mate-

rial which has been proven conclusively to be an interpolation.

As a study to be written in English, I wish that there

were accurate translations of all the original works used in
this study.

Unfortunately, only a limited number of trans-

lations are available, and they are often inadequate for a

philosophical analysis that demands precision in rendering
original works.

With the exception of the official transla-

tion of the works of Mao Tse-tung which requires relatively

few corrections,

I

have found it necessary to translate the

passages cited in this study myself.

However, I have bene-

fitted greatly from the available translations®

To give due

13

credit to the translations which

I

have consulted and to

provide a guide to those who wish to
explore further,
indicated these translations in footnotes.

I

have

In this connec-

tion,

I

must mention an excellent collection of
translations

which

I

have consulted from time to time but have mentioned

specifically in footnotes only in a few instances.

It is

A

Source Book in Chinese Philosophy by Wing-tsit Chan,^

Translating Chinese philosophical works into English

proves to be a difficult task.

Many Chinese philosophical

terms have no adequate synonyms in English.
'tao'

)

For example,

literally means 'way' or 'path'.

It has been

used to designate empirical laws of things and human affairs,
a rational means to a given end, and various basic principles

of political ethics similar to the "law of nature" in West-

ern philosophy.
'Truth' or 'Tao'.

It has been translated as the ’Way* or the

Similarly, it is almost impossible to

find a synonym for Li

(

), a key term of Neo-Confucianism.

It has been translated variously as 'law',

or 'principle'.

'reason', 'order'

These and some other terms are so compli-

cated in their meanings that they cannot be adequately translated or transliterated into English without some explanations.
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I

shall therefore devote some space
to clarify the meanings

of these terms at appropriate
places.

E * Value-cognitivism and Its Denial

The various and often conflicting theories
which have

been advanced by both Chinese and Western political
philos-

ophers in answer to the question whether or not certain
basic

principles of political ethics can be shown to be objectively
true or false may be divided into two categories! value-cog-

nitivism and value-noncognitivism.
i.

Value -Cognitivism

The metaethical theory of value- cognitivism affirms

that basic moral principles are, and can be shown to be,

objectively true or false.

But how the goodness of a state

of affairs and rightness of a political action can be known
is answered differently by the two schools of value- cognitivism: intuitionism and naturalism.

Value-cognitivists of dif-

ferent schools or even the same school also often differ as
to what basic normative principles of politics are objectively

true or false

15

Naturalism .

Naturalism in general holds that certain

moral principles can be shown to be true or
false because
moral judgments just state a special subclass of
facts about
the natural world

1

or because moral principles can somehow

be reduced to true descriptive generalizations.

According to

William K. Frankena,

many philosophers have sought to show that certain
moral and other value judgments are actually rooted
in fact or, as it used to be put, in "the nature of
thing .... One who follows this line of thought,
however, seems to be committed to claiming that ethical and value judgments can be derived logically
from factual ones, empirical or nonempirical.H
11

In contrast to this simpler form of naturalism, a more

sophisticated form of naturalism, known as the definist theory, holds that "ethical terms can be defined in terms of non-

ethical ones, and ethical sentences can be translated into

nonethical ones of a factual kind."^

In other words, it

holds that "an ethical or value judgment simply is an assertion of a fact-- that ethical and value terms constitute merely
an alternative vocabulary for reporting facts.
’good*

For example,

is said to mean the same as *what is conducive to

pleasure*. Given this definition, judgments about the good-

16

ness of actions or states of affairs
are factual judgments
about the quantity (and/or quality)
of pleasure they produce.

Good

or

right

has also been defined to mean 'what
is de-

sired or approved’ by the majority, by
the 'experts' or by
the speaker.

Given this definition, judgments about
goodness

rightness are again factual judgments.
If either form of naturalism is correct, then
ethical

judgments can be justified by empirical investigation just
as ordinary factual statements can.

Intuitionism .

Intuitionism holds that certain basic

moral principles are true, and they "can be seen to be true
by any person with the necessary insight.

According to this

view, a person who can grasp the truth of true ethical gen-

eralizations does not accept them as the result of a process
of ratiocination; he just sees without argument that they

are and must be true, and true of all possible worlds.
Some intuitionists agree with definists that ethical

terms stand for properties of things.

However, intuition-

ists

deny that the properties referred to by words like
"good" and "ought” are definable in nonethical

17

terms. In fact, they insist
that some of these
ieS
*Udefinab le
simple and unanalyzable, as yellowness and
pleasantness.... But
they are not natural or empirical
properties as
are pleasantness and yellowness.
They are of a
very different kind, being non-natural
or nonempirical and, so to speak, normative
rather than
^actual.... According to this view,
as for the
e inists, ethical and value
judgments are true
or false; but they are not factual
and cannot be
justified by empirical observation or metaphysical
reasoning,
fhe basic ones, particular or general,
are self-evident and can only be known by
intuition; this follows, it is maintained, from
the
fact that the properties involved are simple and

Sf ^

^

non-natural. lJ

schools of intuitionism, however, disagree

with one another about how the quality of goodness and rightness in general and the quality of political goodness and
rightness in particular can be known.

As we shall see, in-

tu itionists like Lao Tzu and Mencius maintain that the quality of goodness and rightness can be known, not by the five

senses which every normal human being possesses, but by a

moral sense which, according to Mencius, all men are endowed

with at the time of birth, or, according to Lao Tzu, can be
attained by most, if not all, after arduous efforts in accordance with his prescription.
Some intuitionists hold that religious insight is a

18

valid method to prove the truth or falsity
of basic principles or political ethics.

A third group of intuitionists

maintains that certain normative principles of
politics are
known to be true, not by moral or religious
insight, but by

rational insight.
leader of the

According to Chu Hsi, the most influential

rationalistic school" of Neo-Confucianism,

reason with the aid of other faculties "necessarily knows"

what is objectively right or wrong,
ii. Value-Noncognitivism

Value-noncognitivism holds that "basic ethical principles
have no cognitive status; they cannot be known to be either
true or false because they are not true or false; and they
are neither true nor false because they do not affirm or deny

that something is the case,"-^

Noncognitivists maintain that ethical terms such as
'good' or 'evil'

and 'right' or 'wrong' do not designate any

property, and ethical judgments in which these and similar

ethical terms occur are not statements that assert or deny
that something is the case.

If moral statements neither af-

firm nor deny that something is the case, then they cannot
be either true or false.

In the words of Alfred Jules Ayer,

19

one of the most influential
exponents of this view (which is
known as "the emotive theory of value 11
),
ln saying that a certain type of action
is right
or wrong, I am not making any factual
statement
not even a statement about my own state of
mind!
I am expressing certain moral
sentiments.... It is
worth mentioning that ethical terms do not
serve
only to express feeling. They are calculated
also
to arouse feeling, and so to stimulate action.
Indeed some of them are used in such a way as to
give the sentences in which they occur the effect
of commands.... If a sentence makes no statement
at all, there is obviously no sense in asking
whether what it says is true or false. 17

For example, the term ’wrong' in the statement 'killing

under x condition is wrong

and the 'right* in the statement

Killing under x condition is right' express the speaker's

approval or disapproval of killing under a certain circumstance.

The disagreement between those who maintain the for-

mer position and those hold the latter is, according to
Charles L. Stevenson, a "disagreement in attitude.

They

may agree on all relevant facts about a specific case of
killing and yet still disagree as to the rightness or wrongness of the action.

Some of them may maintain that human

life should not be taken under any circumstances.

Others

20

may argue that human life,
whether actual Qr potential>
may
be taken if it is necessary,
for
example, to protect the

life of the mother, to prevent
the pain of old age, to
pro-

mote the welfare of the family (or
state)
purity of race, etc.

,

to maintain the

Noncognitivists maintain that

Fundamental moral disputes cannot be
resolved
any objective way, and fundamental
moral
claims cannot be inductively established
or de
ductively proven or demonstrated in any
other
way. Morality is not a matter of knowledge. 19

m

More recently, noncognitivists have come to
emphasize
the prescriptive aspect of ethical language.

According to

them, ethical language performs the function of commending
or condemning a certain action or kind of action.

advice or guides action.

It gives

R. M, Hare, a representative

spokesman for this prescriptive theory holds that

the primary function of the word 'good* is to
commend... o When we commend or condemn anything,
it is always in order, at least indirectly, to
guide choices, our own or other people's, now or
in the future. 20

Unlike the emotive theory which emphasize the attitude-

expressing and attitude -evoking aspect of moral language, the

21

prescriptive theory stresses the
social function of ethical
statements. "What makes an
utterance normative is precisely
its dynamism, its trigger function;
a normative utterance is
an utterance that guides conduct
and molds or alters attitude ." 21

^

of the Proposed Analysis

This study is organized according to
the metaethical

theories of various Chinese political
philosophers and not

according to the chronological order of their
appearance in
history.
In Chapter Two, I will analyze Chinese
political phi-

losophers who subscribe to the metaethics of intuitionism

based on moral, religious, and rational insights.

Next, I

take up thinkers representing two forms of naturalism.
In Chapter Four, I shall examine value-noncognitivism in

Chinese political philosophy.

In the concluding chapter, I

shall give a brief summary of this analysis and its implications.

Evidently, my purpose is not to make an original con-

tribution to metaethics.

I

propose to apply the methods of

22

analytic philosophy to the
study of a particular
area of
Chinese political theory, namely,
political ethics. My
objective is to provide an analytic
interpretation and a

critical understanding of different
Chinese political philosophies which are often grouped
under Confucianism, NeoConfucianism, Moism, Taoism, Legalism,
Socialism, and Comraunism.

In this effort, I shall try to
give an accurate presen-

tation of these philosophies and state my
criticisms.

I

am

convinced that only one of the conflicting
metaethical theories can be correct.

without stating which

To present these conflicting theories
I

consider the correct one is, it seems

to me, to shrink from making a judgment in this matter.

A

statement of my criticism perhaps will also serve to stimulate

further discussions among the students of Chinese political

philosophy and thereby indirectly help to increase our understanding of this crucial problem.

To this end, I believe it

is worthwhile to state my views in this analysis.
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CHAPTER

II

IN TU IT ION I SM AS THE
FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL ETHICS

The metaethical theory of
intuitionism holds that basic
ethical terms such as 'good' or
'right' stand for "non-natural properties" which are simple,
indefinable or unanalyzable.

According to this theory, ethical
statements and value judgments can be objectively true or false
because they are
statements asserting these properties or
ascribing these

properties to things,

Intuitionists maintain that the qual-

ity of goodness or rightness, unlike
natural properties such
as yellowness and pleasantness which can
be known by sense

experience, can only be apprehended by a certain
kind of intuition,

Consequently, basic principles of political ethics

can be known to be objectively true or false, not by
empirical observation, but by insight,

Intuitionists, however, differ with one another about
the kind of intuition which enables men to attain true moral

knowledge.

In this chapter we shall examine the political

philosophies of some eminent Chinese intuitionists who maintain that certain basic normative principles of politics can

24

be known to be objectively
true by moral or religious
or

rational insight*

A,

i.

Based on Moral Insight

Lao Tzu

Lao Tzu (b. 570 B.C,?), the founder of
Taoism, has been

classified as a naturalist by most authors
0

Such a classi-

fication, however, is based on his ethical
position rather

than on his metaethical position.

To eliminate this confus-

ing and misleading designation, he may be called
an ethical

naturalist and a metaethical intuitionist.
Lao Tzu

1

s

Ethical Principles ,

Lao Tzu is an ethical

naturalist in the sense that he advocates the moral principle
that men ought to follow the Tao or Way of Nature by leading
a simple, ’’natural,” and primitive way of life.

consensus of more than fifteen authors whom

I

This is the

have consulted.

However, no single Chinese equivalent for the word 'ought,'
one of the most important “trade marks" of an ethical -normative statement in Western philosophy, occurs in the entire

book of the Lao Tzu .

His moral principles, like those of

*

*
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some Western philosophers,
are couched in the form
of empir
ical generalizations, often using
terms having a laudatory

connotation.

He says, for example,

Man patterns himself after [the Way
of] the Earth,
The Earth patterns itself after
Heaven
Heaven patterns itself after Tap (Way)
Tao patterns itself after Nature .
Grammatically, this passage looks and sounds
like "the

young men in the United States pattern their
hair style after the Beatles'."

deceptive.

The grammatical appearance, however, is

The latter sentence is empirical because it con-

tains only descriptive terms:

The verb 'pattern' is used to

describe the making or fashioning of their hairs according to
the hair style of the Beatles.
'the Way of the Earth,'

The same word 'pattern' and

'Heaven' and 'Nature' in Lao Tzu's

statement are not used in the empirical sense, but in a nor-

mative-ethical sense.

The 'Tao' or 'Way' refers to those,

and only those, ways which, in Lao Tzu's judgment, are good
and which men ought to imitate.

The verb 'pattern' is being

used to prescribe that men ought to act according to the Way
or Tao which is good rather than to describe that men actually

o
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do so

The word ’pattern' is
a translation of
the Chinese

word fS

(H

)

or 'law'.

According to Chinese and
English

dictionaries, 'law' means, among
other things, a binding
rule of conduct, and 'pattern'
means "something regarded
as
a normative example to be copied"
or "a model accepted or

proposed for imitation."

As a verb, as it is used
in the

passage quoted, it means to act
according to the pattern or
law, which, in this context, is the
Tao of the Earth, Heaven,
and Nature.

Thus, the whole passage acquires
a normative

character
One of the favorite techniques employed
by all Chinese

moral philosophers except a few modern moralists
is to put
their own moral principles into the mouth of
the Sage(s) or
to present their own normative principles of
politics in the

form of historical statements to the effect that they
were
the political ethics of the ancient sages.

Since the Sage

(who usually remains unidentified) is regarded as the perfect

moral model for all men in Chinese culture, an evocation of
his words or actions, actual or alleged, becomes in effect
a Chinese way of stating indirectly that acting this way is

right.

Thus, when Lao Tzu says that “the Sage manages the
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affairs of non-action (wu^wei
,

^

,

literally inactivity)

and practices the teaching of
quietude,'-2

lt is UIHnistaka .

ble to the Chinese reader that
he is exhorting all men,
especially all rulers and government
officials, to practice
the teaching, oi quietude.

This reading is supported by
his

assertion that "the good man is (which
here means: ought to
be) the teacher of the bad," and that
"the man of superior

virtue practices non-action, and he does so
without ulterior
motive; the man of inferior virtue takes action,
and he does
so with ulterior motive." 3

man" and a man of

"

The Sage is, of course, a "good

superior" virtue,,

According to Lao Tzu, wu-wei or "non-action" is the Tao
of Nature.

It does not mean "inactivity" in the literal sense

but rather taking no action that is contrary to the Way of

Nature.

To practice "non- act ion," therefore, means to follow

the Way of Nature,

The teaching of quietude is an applica-

tion of the principle of "non- act ion" in the area of education in the broad sense of the term, and is intended by Lao

Tzu to counter the rival doctrine which stresses the active
study of language, books and techniques of argumentation.
If the Way of Nature is good and "non-action" is the Way
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of Nature as Lao Tzu maintains,
then a ruler who practices

"non-action" is a good ruler.

This is his conclusion. He

pronounces that the best ruler is the
one who knows the Tao
and follows it by doing the least
governing 0
The best of all the rulers is the one
whose
existence the people are barely aware of
0
The next best is one who is loved aid
praised.
The next is one who is feared.
The next is one who is despised.
When there is not enough faith in others,
They will have no faith in him.
With great concern, [the best ruler] values his
own words.
When his task is accomplished and work done,
The people all say, "He is natural (tkj-ian .&jfl ." 4
His ideal society is a small state in which the people,

who have few desires, little knowledge and no ambition, lead
a peaceful, inactive, and simple way of life . 5

Lao Tzu there-

fore condemns any conscious attempt by men to interfere with
the Way of Nature and what he believed to be the "natural way
of life."

To advocate any non-Taoistic moral principles is

to make such an attempt.

He is particularly critical of the

basic Confucian moral principles such as "humanity," filial
piety, and "righteousness," and the basic Confucian values
such as wisdom and loyalty.

He declares that they are the

^
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products of degeneration
following the fall of men
from the
"natural way of life ." 6
Moral Insight and the Tan.
is known?

But what is Tao? And how
it

Lao Tzu used the term 'tao'
in two different

senses without distinguishing them,
namely the normative
and descriptive senses.

Tao

Ci&

)

literally means the way or path by
which peo-

ple reach their destination, or through
figurative usage the

method or means by which men accomplish
their objectives.
'Tao*

in this sense is a descriptive term.

When Lao Tzu

claims that non-action or non-interference is
the best way
to a simple and peaceful life, he is using 'tao*
in this

descriptive sense.
'Tao'

in the moral sense involves the intrinsic moral

judgment that a certain way of life or a certain course of
action ought to be followed for its own sake by all men
or
by all men with certain characteristics under certain circum-

stances

,

such as policy-makers in their public life.

When

Lao Tzu says that all men ought to follow the Tao of Nature
by leading a "natural" way of life, not as a means to some
other end, but as an end in itself because it is desirable
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for its own sake, he is using
'tao 1 in the normative
sense.

To distinguish the two senses
of 'tao 1

,

I

shall use small

letters for the descriptive and
capital letters for the normative sense,
Lao Tzu takes Tao as something not
unlike Plato's Form,
He says,

There is something (wu,#£? ) undifferentiated
and yet complete in itself.
It existed before Heaven and Earth.
Soundless and shapeless , it stands alone and
does not change.
It prevails everywhere and is free from danger.
It may be considered as the mother of the universe.
I do not know its name,
I styled it Tao .
An.cl in the absence of a better
word named it Great. ®

Tao as the mother of the universe may remind Western

readers

oj_

Platonic Ultimate Reality in contradistinction to

the illusory world of phenomena . 9

While Plato maintains

that the form of Goodness is "perfectly real" and "perfectly

knowable ," 10

Lao Tzu holds that "Tao is a thing which is

elusive and vague.
form (hsiang .
0

^

).

thing (wu ,^)." 11

Elusive and vague, yet there is in it a
Elusive and vague, yet there is in it a
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Tao is not only elusive and
vague, it cannot even be
adequately discussed. For Lao
Tzu insists that "The Tao
that can be talked about is not
the eternal Tao." 1 ? Even
so, he dwelled on Tao at great
length.

If this seems para-

doxical to some students of Lao Tzu's
philosophy, it is because they equate the difficulty of
putting the true eternal
Tao into conventional language with
the impossibility of
knowing the Tao.

While Lao Tzu admitted the inadequacy
of

language, he holds that the Tao is not
beyond the reach of

certain men with special faculties . 13

The question is by what faculty?

The following passage

provides his answer.

Without stepping beyond one's doors,
One can know the world.
Without peeping through one's window.
One can see (chien,
the Tao of Nature.
)
The further one goes,
The less one knows.
Therefore the sages know without travelling,
Apprehend (ming . % ) without looking , 14 and
Accomplish without any action.

£

Lao Tzu used the term 'see* to refer to the discovery of
the Tao of Nature. His conclusion that the sages "apprehend

without looking” suggest^ however, that the Tao is not dis-
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red by the use of our
eyes.

Since the passage quoted

does not refer to sense
perception. Lao Tzu can
only be understood to be "seen" by so.e
sixth or .oral sense.
This
interpretation is supported by
the way he described
the
thread of Tao" or the essence
of Tao .
It reads,
We look at it but cannot see
it;
Its name is the Invisible.
We listen to it but cannot hear
it;
Its name is the Inaudible.
We grasp it but cannot get it;
Its name is the Subtle.
These three cannot be further inquired
intoThey therefore fuse into one.
Its upper part is not bright.
And its lower part not obscure.
Infinite and boundless,
It cannot be given any name.
It returns to nothingness.
This is called the shape without a shape,
form (hsiang.
) without substance.
This is called the vague and elusive.
Go toward it and we cannot see its head;
Follow it and we cannot see its back.^6

^

And in another passage he said, "The words uttered by

Tao are insipid and flavorless.

We look (shlh .^^

)

at Tao .

p

but it cannot be seen .^

heard .

We listen to it, but it cannot be

Yet if you use it, it is inexhaustible.

Since the Tao is invisible, it can only be apprehended

,
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by the moral sense.
to all.

Even this moral sense is
not arailable

Only the moral sense of those
who have attained the

utmost vacuity” and "genuine quietude"
can "see" the true
Tap.

19

iio Mencius

JLq) and Wang Yang-Ming (2

In contrast to Lao Tzu's position
that true moral intu-

ition is available only to those who have
attained the utmost

vacuity and genuine quietude, Mencius (372-289 B.C.),
the
founder of what is known as the idealistic school
of Confucianism, maintains that all men possess innate knowledge
of

right and wrong and the innate ability to do what is right.
He uses the theory of innate knowledge to establish the in-

trinsic rightness of acting according to the principle of

humanity (or benevolence) and righteousness (or justice)
and relies on descriptive definitions of value terms as well
as empirical generalizations to establish the normative prin-

ciple that certain human dispositions, traits of character
or feelings are good and ought to be cultivated.

The former

is a form of intuit ionism and the latter represents a type
of naturalism.

In this section I shall examine his version

^
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Of intuitionlsm; his version
of naturalism will be
discussed
in the following chapter.

Inn ate Knowledge of Moral

Mencius defines

innate knowledge and innate ability
in the following terms:
The ability possessed by men
without having been
acquired^ by learning is innate ability
(liangfc
) > and the knowledge possessed by
men
e ibera tion is innate knowledge
(liang^
^
c hih , g £i) 0
Children carried in the arms all
to
love
ks2H
their parents, and as they gro^Tthey
kM”* to respect their elder brothers. To
have
affection for parents is humanity (jen,
benevolence) , and to respect elders is righteousness
justice). These are universal in the world
»
without exception .

M

^

^

,

In other words, Mencius maintains that all
men are en-

dowed with the knowledge of right and wrong and they
have
the natural tendency to act according to what is right,
which,
for Mencius, means acting according to the principles of hu-

manity and righteousness.

This interpretation is confirmed

by another key passage:

All men have the hsin (/C , literally, heart) of
compassion; all men have the hsin of shame and
dislike; all men have the hsin of humility and
reverence; and all men have the hsin of right and
wrong. The hsin of compassion is humanity; the
hsin of shame and dislike is righteousness; the

7
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utility and rev erence is
propriety (lT
and the hsin of right 31101
and wY*r*n & is wisdom
?
s
(chlh
Humor,,Humanity, righteousness,
proprietv
and wisdom are not gilded
onto us from without*
ntl P° S ° eS- (
> them.
[People
Z
CaUSe ^ they have not refl
-ted
upon°this°matter.21

ya
^F)>
\

.

-f

'j

,

2 ~g
iiSiS (Aj

)

^> ® ^

literally means ’heart

dered as ’feeling’.

1

.

It is often ren-

But neither ’heart’ nor ’feeling’
is

an adequate translation of what Mencius
intended to say.
What he means by this word is the natural
disposition to

know what is right and wrong.

The hsin is therefore the

seat of innate moral knowledge, at
least when it functions

as "the heart of right and wrong,"
although Mencius did not
say so explicitly.

Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529)

,

a leader of

the idealistic school of Neo-Confucianism
who reaffirmed the
|

ai metaethical position, unequivocally
identifies the

hsin with the innate knowledge.

The hsin of right and wrong knows without deliberation and it can do so without having acquired
it by learning.
This is what is called innate
knowledge. 22

The hsin or heart in this moral sense cannot be rendered
as 'feeling*.

In Wang Yang-ming'

s

words,
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Sentiment
) and innate
clearly distinguished. All knowledge must he
that idef! Tf'
%
includes thoughts, desires
in response to things
sentiment may be right or
wrong
That wMeh
capable of knowing the right
and wrong of fsennt
calle lnnate knowledge.
If you follow
rhe innate knowledge,
f
the
nothing can be wrong. 23

U.f

•

In this sense, Mencius' hsin,
like the heart for JeanJacques Kousseau, 24 is the source,
or "the root" in Mencian

terms, 25

of man's ethical knowledge,,

According to Mencius, men ought to act
in accordance

with the moral principles known to them
through their innate
knowledge.

Since he believes that all men possess
both innate

knowledge of right and wrong and the innate
ability to do
what is right, he condemns those who refuse to
acknowledge
the validity of the true moral principles and those
who refuse to act accordingly.

Men have these Four Beginnings [of humanity,
righteousness, propriety, and wisdom] just as
they have their four limbs. When a man, who
has these Four Beginnings, proclaims that he
cannot practice them, he is robbing himself. He
who proclaims that his ruler cannot practice
them is robbing his ruler. 26

In his judgment, the major function of government ought

37

to be to create and maintain
an environment conducive
to
the fullest development of the
Four Beginnings or Four Virtues.
Economic measures, educational
systems, and basic

welfare programs deemed necessary
for the goal were spelled
out in some details by Menciuso^

According to Mencius, political authority
should be

placed in the hands of those who have
developed these virtues and who have the ability and will
to practice the

"kingly way" or "the way of the true king"
(wang-tao

which, in contrast to "the way of the hegemonic
tyrant"

tao,^$^), contains

^

.

(j

£-

the principles of humane or benevolent

government (jen-cheng .^

)

„
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His argument is:

"I have

not heard of one who bent himself [i a e», violated the
true

moral principles], and yet was able to straighten others;

how much less of one who disgraced himself and yet rectified
the whole world." 2 ^

iii. Objections to Intuitionism Based on Moral Insight .

The intuitionism of Lao Tzu, Mencius and Wang Yang-ming
affirms that basic ethical terms refer to certain non-natural

properties whose objective existence can be known by moral
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insight.

If basic ethical terms
referred to certain non-

naturai properties as they maintained,
then it would be
self-contradictory for a man to affirm
that an action or a
state of affairs has one of the
non-natural properties specified by one of them and deny that
it is good, or to main-

tain that something which does not have
any of the non-natural properties they have specified is
good.

It cannot be

denied, however, that there are people who
maintain that

something which does not have any of the properties
specified by Lao Tzu, Mencius and Wang Yang-ming is
good 0

For

example, hedonists maintain that happiness (or pleasure)
is
good*

The intuitionists of course deny that

hedonists (and all those who do not have moral insight) can
have the true knowledge of goodness.

They assert that moral

insight is the only method to gain the true knowledge of
goodness.

This position, however, makes ethical judgments

unverifiable to all who deny that intuition is a source of
objective knowledge.

Those who affirm that something has the alleged non-

natural property specified by one of the three intuitionists
and deny that it is good or right are in effect challenging
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the validity of one intuition
by another intuition.

This
is an instance of conflicting
intuitions which cannot be

settled by appealing to moral
intuition.

For what if A

claims to know with absolute certainty
that to promote his
own greatest good by leading a
"natural way of life” regardless of what may happen to other people
is intrinsically

right and ought to be done, whereas B
claims to know with
equal absolute certainty that to love all
men including his

enemy is intrinsically right and that government
ought to
take all necessary actions to promote the welfare
of all?
*-

s

possible to test the validity of a claim that

one is able to see something which is not seen by others

because he has reached a certain altitude, there is no way
to test whether one has seen the Tao with his moral sense.

The so-called "truth serum" or "lie detecting machine" will
not be able to help, for most, if not all, moral philosophers
of this school honestly believe that they have eliminated

selfish desires, attained "utmost vacuity," and maintained

"genuine quietude" in accordance with Lao Tzu's instruction,
and that they have really "seen" the true Tao .

As an honest

and convinced moral philosopher, each can be expected to

40

claim that those who disagreed
with him have not seen the
true Tao,

and he alone or he and those
who agreed with him

alone have seen the genuine Tao.

But this type of argument

amounts to nothing more than a claim
of the subjective certainty of his own intuition without proving
in any way the

validity of the moral " statement” in question.
In the similar situation, Mencius and Wang
Yang-ming

cannot legitimately question the validity of those
who intuited the basic moral principles which differ from
their
own moral principles, for both have maintained, as we
have
seen, that all men possess innate moral knowledge.

Mencius

attempts to solve the problem of conflicting intuitions by
four types of argument.

First, he declares that his serious

moral opponents, such as Mo Tzu and Yang Chu, are "birds and
beasts

( ch*

in- shou . 'M'-j&O n

implying that they are not men

who, according to his own theory, possess innate moral knowledge. J

It is an easy way out, but no arbitrary declaration,

however, can deny the biological fact that his moral opponents
are men.

Second, he maintains that a man may abandon or lose

his innate knowledge.

^

If so, Mencius may claim that the

moral insights of certain men are false.

But this argument

.
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contradicts his assertion that all
men have the same innate
moral knowledge. Even if we were
to accept the contention
that all men originally had such a
knowledge but some of

them lost it thereafter, we are not
provided with any ob-

jective criterion by which to determine who
has and who has

not lost his innate moral knowledge.

Third, Mencius also

speaks of the quantitative differences in the
development of
the Four Virtues, including the "heart of right and
wrong.”
In regard to them, he says.

Some men have twice as much as others, some five
times as much, and some to an incalculable amount,
because some men did not develop their natural endowments to the fullest extent. 32

It is not clear whether Mencius intends to say that

there are quantitative differences in the development of

man

1

s

innate moral knowledge

Wang Yang-ming, who, as already pointed out, shares
Mencius' metaethical position, denies any differences in

man's innate knowledge.

He asserts that

The innate knowledge is in the heart of all men
and without differences between the sage and the
blockhead. The whole world, past and present,
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has it in common.
If the gentlemen of
the world
te t emS6l eS t0 the
extens ion of the
i
^
u
innate Imowledge,
then
they shall be able to
sshare with all the universal
right and wrong
share their likes and dislikes
in common, look
upon other people as their own,
look upoA the
l0 ° k Upon Heaven,
Earth^and
Earth
and the myriad things as one body.
To seek
a world without order, then,
will not be possible. 33

iniL^

If Mencius does indeed implicitly
claim that men differ

in the development of their innate knowledge,
the question

then is whether an objective measurement
of its development
is possible.

Mencius did not provide, and he could not
have

provided, any objective method to measure the
development of

man's innate knowledge.

In the absence of an objective cri-

terion, competing claims of what is right and wrong
cannot be

objectively settled on the ground of differences in the de-

velopment of the contestants' innate moral knowledge.
fourth, both Mencius and Wang Yang-ming also resorted

to the argument that man's innate knowledge may be obscured

by selfish desires.
to this position.

Our criticisms of Lao Tzu apply also
Furthermore, by declaring that his moral

rivals were obscured by selfish desires, ^5

Wang Yang-ming

pronounces in effect that a man's innate knowledge is unob-
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structed if, and only if, it
knows that the principles
of
humanity and righteousness are
the true moral principles.
Since these principles are Wang
Yang-ming's (and Mencius')
own moral principles, this means
simply, "you have the unobstructed innate moral knowledge if,
and only if, y ou agree
and accept my moral principles."
Since Lao Tzu, Mencius, and Wang Yang-ming
all fail to

provide any objective, i.e., intersubjective,
criterion by

which to decide the truth and falsity of
competing moral
insights,

I

conclude that their moral insights do not
yield

objective ethical knowledge.

B » Based on Religious Insight : Mo Tzu

)

One of the most striking contrasts between the history

of Chinese and Western political thought is the fact that

there are few prominent political philosophers among reli-

gious leaders or theologians in the former, with the exception of Mo Tzu (468-376 B.C.?), the founder of Moism as a

religion as well as a school of philosophy.

Moism was one

of the greatest schools of philosophy in ancient China which

,

6
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provided a serious if relatively
temporary challenge to Con
fucianism from the fifth to the
third century B.C.
Un iversal Love and Condemnation
nf

The ke y S tone

of Mo Tzu's religion as well as
his philosophy is the will
of Heaven (i.e.

,

the will of an anthropomorphic
God).

The will of Heaven is to me like the
compass to
the wheelwright and the square to the
carpenter.
The wheelwright and the carpenter
use the compass
and square to measure all circles
and squares in
the world, saying,
that which agrees with the
standard is right, and that which does
not is
wrong.
Now the writings of the scholars and gentlemen of the world are too numerous to
be loaded
in carts and the doctrines and speeches
they have
produced are too numerous to be enumerated.
They
try to persuade the feudal lords above and
various
minor officials below. But as to humanity and
justice, they are far, far off the mark. How
do
I know?
I say: I have found the shining
standard
law, i.e.
the will of Heaven) in the
,
world to measure them. 3

ihe will

oi.

Heaven is Mo fzu*

s

moral compass and square

with which he measures “the governing activities of kings,
feudal lords and other officials above, the myriad people of
the world below, and literature, doctrines and debates.^' It
is the standard of good and evil, right and wrong.

To him,

that which is in accord with the will of Heaven is good, and

3
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thst which is not is evil .3

According to Mo Tzu, the will
of Heaven enjoins universal love and forbids wars. He
has defended his basic
moral principles on at least five
different grounds, of

which only one may be properly said to
be based on religious
insight.

Since he used all five grounds to
"demonstrate"

that these principles were the will of Heaven,

I

shall ex-

amine all of them.
By universal love

(

chien-ai

.

)

Mo Tzu means loving

all men without distinction, not only in the sense
that

every man ought to love all others equally regardless of
their biological and social relationships with him, but that
he loves all others to the same degree and the same way as

he loves himself.

His principle of universal love enjoins

everyone "to love others as he loves himself ,"39

^

*»

t0

regard other people's countries as his own, regard other
people's families as his own, and regard other people's
bodies as his own.

11

^

He therefore condemns those who "know

only to love their own states, family, and body" and not
those of others.

He did so because they would have violated

the will of Heaven, which "wants men to mutually love and
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benefit one another, and does
not want them to mutually
hate or injure one another,”^
If the will of Heaven
enjoins all men to act
according

to the principles of mutual
love and mutual benefit,
and

forbids mutual hatred and mutual
injury, then wars, especially offensive wars, are clear
violations of the will of
Heaven.

While it may be argued that a nation
may out of

love go to war against another nation
to "liberate" the

people therein from brutality, oppression,
inhuman treatment,
etc.

,

the inevitable killing of the people
constitutes se-

rious injury to the very people who die in the
process.

In

a famous chapter entitled "Condemnation of
War,” he force-

fully argued that

Killing one man constitutes an injustice and [the
must receive a death sentence. According
to this doctrine, killing ten men increases the
injustice by tenfold and [the killer] must receive
ten death sentences; killing a hundred men increases the injustice by a hundredfold and [the
killer] must receive a hundred death sentences.
In all these cases, the gentlemen of the world all
know to condemn it and declare, "it is unjust 1"
Now, when it comes to the greatest of all injustice,
the invasion of another nation [which involves the
killing of even more men] , they do not know to condemn it.
Instead, they praise it and declare, "It
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posterity?^

question, however, arises
whether there is a "will
of Heaven" in the first place,
and if so, how can we be
sure that a specific moral principle
or a specific set of
i’he

moral principles is the will of Heaven.

This was the very

question Ho Tzu attempted to answer.
Knowing the Will of Heaven .

For an orderly discussion,

Mo Tzu's answers may be divided into five
categories.
(!) T he existence of an anthropomorphic God can be
es -

tablished by what t he people see and hear .

If there is to

be the will of Heaven, the existence of an
anthropomorphic

God must be established.

But how?

According to Mo Tzu, it

can be established by what the common people actually "see
and hear."

He asserts that

throughout the world, the way to ascertain the
existence or non-existence of something is to
use, as a testing standard, what the eyes and
ears of the common people actually know: If they
have actually heard it and seen it, then we must
assume that it exists; if they have never heard
or seen it, then we must assume that it does not
exist. 43
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He challenges those who
have any doubt about
the ex-

istence and the will of
supernatural beings, including
that
of an anthropomorphic "Heaven"
(God) , to go to some
villages
or communities and ask.
He then proceeds to
produce stories
from "annals" and various "historical
records" to prove his

contention.
The assertion is so patently false it
is unlikely that

Mo Tzu means the "seeing” or "hearing” of
the common people
in the literal sense.

Mo Tzu appears to maintain that the

common people believe in the allegation of some
people, presumably with some special ability, to the effect that
they

have seen an anthropomorphic God and heard His will.

If

S o,

he is no longer defending his case on ground
(1) but on (2)
or (3) discussed in the following pages.
(2)

The deeds of sage-kings "prove" the existence of an

anthropomorphic God .

Since Mo Tzu was fully aware of the

fact that many of his contemporaries maintained that "the

eyes and ears of the multitude cannot be trusted and are in-

sufficient to settle doubts,"^

he asked whether the words

and deeds of the ancient sage-kings could be accepted as a

standard in such matters.

His own answer is:

"Men who are
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above average all say, 'The
sa g e-ki„g s of the
Three Dynasties of antiquity are
sufficient to be a standard
(f|, >|
law).'" 45
He then went on to cite
examples from oaths, dec,

larations, decrees, books, etc.,
which, according to his interpretation, show that the sage-kings
must have believed
in the existence of supernatural
beings. He cites sacrifices offered by them on various
occassions as an evidence
to support his contention.

"If there are no spirits and

gods," he asks, "then why would [sage-]
King Wu divide sac-

rificial duties [among feudal lords]
Contrary to Mo Tzu’s contention, neither
the offering
of sacrifices nor the allocation of
sacrificial duties proves
that the offerers really believed in the
existence of super-

natural beings, much less that they do exist.

The offerers

could be simply following the tradition or playing
politics.
Even if the sage-kings truly believed that there were super-

natural beings, their belief cannot be used to prove their
existence.

While belief may furnish a basis of evidence for

propositions, their truth depends, not on subjective belief,
but on inter subjectively ascertainable evidence.
(3) The

wise know the will of Heaven by their religious

^
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insight.

Mo Tzu uses yet another,
and for this section a

central, argument that there are
some people who, by their
special ability, know the existence,
will, and power of su-

pernatural beings.

These men are called chih-che

or

^1?), which literally means the knower.47
According to the "Moist Canons" and the
"Discourses on
the Canons,

which Liang Ch'i-ch'ao attributes to Mo Tzu

and Hu Shih to Neo-Moists 48
,

the first chih (-£&) "is the

meeting of a man's intelligence and things, thereby
enabling
him to describe their forms and shapes, as in seeing. "49
in
other words, it is Knowledge derived from sensory
experience.

fhe second chih

(^£), which is composed of chih

^,

(7

to know or perceptual knowledge) and hsin
(/^, mind) is no

longer found in any of the existing Chinese dictionaries.
In the "Moist Canons" it is defined as "an insight (ming

also means clear or understanding)

#

n 50

it i s f ur ther ex-

plained as "discourses on things by a man's intelligence
(chih,

2

.

,

which should read chih

wisdom) and his knowl-

edge of them is distinct, as in insight (or understanding) ."^1

To know in this manner is to know precisely in a way described by the Chinese ideogram:

To know by mind.
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Apparently, the wise such
as the sa g e- k i„ gs of
antiq .
uity mentioned in (2) and Mo T
zu himself "see" or
"know"
the existence, will, and
power of an anthropomorphic
God,

not through perception of the
regular five senses, but
through insight of their minds.
For if they know through
their five senses, all the people
with
the five senses

should also be able to know them.

Since the insight of the

wise has a religious overtone, and since
Mo Tzu is the
founder of Moism as a religion, it seems
justifiable to

characterize their insight as religious insight,
even though
Mo Tzu himself did not use the term.
Two examples from the Mo Tzu will serve to
illustrate
this line of argument and its problems.

He asserts that

Upon examining the reason why the world was
brought to order, it is known that only when the
Son of Heaven (i.e„, emperor) was able to unify
the concepts of right (1,^. , also justice and
righteousness) throughout the world, was the
world brought to order. If the people all identify with the Son of Heaven but not with Heaven,
then calamity is not yet removed. The frequent
whirling winds and bitter rains nowadays are the
punishments of Heaven on the people for their
failure to identify themselves with Heaven. 52

Mo Tzu's claim that these phenomena were the punishments
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meted out by Heaven was based,
not on the sensory experience
of the phenomena, but on
religious insight, an insight
which
allegedly enables the wise to "know"
what is beyond and behind the visible phenomena,.
In the area of politics, the claim
is even more sweep-

ing,

Mo Tzu claims that "Heaven*' (in the
sense of an an-

thropomorphic God) not only enacts basic
moral principles
i.or

rulers to follow, but also carries out His
will by re-

warding those who are faithful and punishing
those who defy
His commands.

(shih,^

Specifically, he claims that Heaven "made

)" the ancient sage-kings "to
have the honor of

being the Son of Heaven and the wealth of the
world" because
"they love universally those whom

benefit universally those whom

1

I

["Heaven"] love; they

benefit," and "made" the

"wicked kings" of antiquity "unable to live out their lifespan and survive their generations" because "they discrimi-

nate and hate those whom
those whom

I

I love;

they injure alternatingly

benefit,

The question is how can we be sure that "Heaven" actu-

ally "made" such rewards and punishments?

Confucianists

have persistently maintained that the same sage-kings were
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rewarded, not because of
their obedience to
the will of
Heaven, but because of their
cultivation and faithful
practice of humanity and
righteousness based on a clear
distinc
tion of five different relations,
i.e., between father and
son, ruler and minister, husband
and wife, elder and younger brothers, and between friends 54
.
They claimed that it

was the magnetic moral force of these
men, not an anthropomorphic God, that turned the people
toward them like all
the stars turning toward the polar
star, and bent the people

like the wind blowing across the
grass , 55
If religious insight is the only
means by which men can

apprehend the existence, will, and power of
an anthropomorphic God and the true moral principles, then
the knowledge
of these matters is available only to those
who are endowed

with true religious insight.

Agnostics, atheists, and most

of the faithful religious followers can never hope to
have

any knowledge of these same matters.

In fact, they have no

way of knowing whether or not those who claim to have true
religious insight do indeed possess such religious insight,
for it takes another religious insight to know whether it is

the case.

And whenever there are conflicting religious in-

i
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Sights, a third religious
insight is needed to
determine
whose insight is the correct
insight.
But this is to beg
the question whether this new,
third insight itself is a
correct insight. Different
religious leaders and followers have disagreed, often violently,
on what was the true

Will of God and whose God was really
in command.

If all

of them considered themselves true
believers, none can be

expected to accept the claim of others.

But this means

that whether something is true or not
depends upon faith,
i.e., whether you believe in it or not,
and not on objec-

tively verifiable evidence.
< 4)

The autho rity of books .

"three laws (san-fa , £/%) u ^ 6
)" 57

-

.

Y

Mo Tzu also speaks of the

or "three criteria (san-piao

.

of distinguishing truth from falsehood (ch'ing -

which should read

c hen- we

.

7h

)

,

the right

from the wrong, and the benefits from the harm, without
specifying whether the tests of truth apply only to factual
assertions, or only to normative assertions, or to both.

Nevertheless, he may be interpreted as taking the position
that the three criteria are the tests of the objective va-

lidity of basic moral principles, including the basic moral
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principles derived from religious
insight.
One of these three criteria
is "the books by the
ancient kings. "58 Mo Tzu
repeatedly urges all
parties to

verify (cheng, y*,

)

their contentions by looking
into the

books by the ancient sage-kings. 59

He implicitly assumes

that statements made in these
books are sufficient to prove
or disprove a moral principle as
objectively true. In fact
he even called these books the
basic laws (hsien
) , not
.

%

only in the sense that they are the
basic laws of the land,
but also in the sense that they are the
basic laws of moral
truth. 6°

These books, however, were written by men, and
as long
as men are fallible, statements made in these
books or any

other book could be mistaken.

Even if the authors were the

wise, as Mo Tzu maintained, statements in their books can-

not be accepted as true unless they can be verified by independent criteria.
(5)

The beneficial consequences "prove” that the prin -

ciple of universal love is true.

Mo Tzu also maintains

that the net outcome produced by the practical application

of a basic moral principle is a test of its truth.

Accord-

56

ing to hi*, if the net
outcome is "beneficial
to the state
and the people," it is
true; if not, false.
It is one of
his major contentions that
following the will of
Heaven by
practicing universal love and
desisting war has brought about, and will continue to
bring about, "the good
order under law, the harmony of the myriad
people, the wealth of
the nation, sufficient supply of
material, and a state in

which all the people have warm clothes,
hearty meals, convenience and tranquility without anxiety ." 61

This, he as-

serts, is not only "beneficial" to the
state and the people,

but also to "Heaven" and spirits . 62

And this is what God

wants for Himself and for the people* 6 ^
I

do not accept such a pragmatic criterion
of truth. If

desirable consequences produced by the practical
application
of a norm were a valid test of its truth, then we
would have
to accept as true, for example, superstitions employed by

many parents and rulers in primitive societies (and by some
parents in this scientific age too) to prevent pre-marital
sexual relations, which Mo Tzu considered undesirable, 6 ^ if

they produce the desirable consequences, as many of them did
in pre-modern societies.

Superstitions, i.e., unfounded
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beliefs, however, cannot be
true whatever consequences
they
produce.

Analytically, "x has beneficial
consequences" contains
an empirical assertion that
x has the consequences
specified in the context of the
discussion, and a value judgment
that the consequences are "beneficial."
The empirical as-

sertion is a hypothesis which may be
either true or false.

Whether the same alleged consequences
are "beneficial" or

not depends on each speaker's personal
value system.

Ac-

cording to value-noncognitivism, there
is no objective cri-

terion by which one may decide whether the
consequences are
ob i ec t ively beneficial*
.

Thus, the same consequences re-

garded as beneficial by Mo Tzu may be regarded
as harmful
by someone who believes that all men ought to
pursue their
own interest regardless of the consequences to others.
I

conclude, therefore, that Mo Tzu's religious insight

does not provide an objective criterion by which one may

determine the truth of fundamental principles of ethics in
general and of political ethics in particular.
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C>

Based on Rational Insight:
Chu Hsi

(^4)

Chu Hsi (Chu Ylian-hui,
1130-1200) is generally considered to be the greatest synthesizer
of Confucian philosophy
as a whole and the most prominent
leader of the "philosophy
of principle (l£-hsueh,^)" or
what is known as the ra-

txonalxstic school of Neo-Confucianism.

According to Wing-

tsit chan, he "has had a greater
impact on Chinese, Korean,

and Japanese thought than any other
Confucianists" except

Confucius and Mencius. 65
As a leading Confucianist his ethical
,
principles were

basically the same as other Confucianists,
including Mencius
and Wang Yang-ming whose ethical principles we
have intro-

duced in the previous section.

humanity (jen, ^

)

In brief, the principle of

is still the kingpin of his moral system.

He said ''humanity is the perfect virtue of the original mind"

and

is the first of all goodness; righteousness, propriety,

and wisdom all come from it. "66

In other words, humanity is

not only one of the Five Constant Virtues (wu-ch

1

ang;

,

namely, humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and
faithfulness) but also the foundation of all goodness.
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Like Mencius and Wang Yangmi„ g( chu Hsi maintains
that political authority
should be given to the
men who
have developed these virtues,
and the chief function
of
government ought to be to create
and maintain an environment conducive to the fullest
development of these virtues.
The most significant difference
between Chu Hsi's philosophy and that of other Confucianists
lies not in his
basic moral principles, but in his
metaethics and metaphysics.

In contrast to Mencius and Wang
Yang-ming who

maintain that moral insight leads to the
knowledge that the
principles of humanity and righteousness
are objectively
true, Chu Hsi holds that the objective
validity of these
same moral principles is apprehended by
rational insight

after an "investigation of things (ko-wu .
Two Senses of Li.

As noted, Chu Hsi's philosophy is

known as the "philosophy of li."

"What is right," he main-

tains, "is the li of Nature (t ien-li .
'

t?

)

wrong is in violation of the li of Nature ." 67

and what is

The imme-

diate question which must be answered is: What is

.li

and

how it is known?
The first question may appear to be a simple one at
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first glance, but it is not,
for Chu Hsi did not
make a
careful and systematic effort
to define what he
meant by
U, which has been translated variously
as 'law , 'reason',
order or principle'. His
conception of li appeared
in
his commentaries on Confucian
Classics, on the works of
his
masters, and in his letters in
reply to questions posed by
his friends, students, and critics
(which have been col1

lected under various titles totalling
more than fifteen
thousand pages).
According to Chu Hsi, "all things have
li; li is not
outside of things or affairs." 68

Between Heaven and earth, there are li and
ch'i
(sfiLt material force, sometime translated as
ether) . JUL is the Tao
Way) that is above
physical form ( hsing-erh-shang .^/. ^ a
i.e.,
without physical form) and is the source from
which thing S#< are produced. Ch'i is the instrument (ch^i,^ ) that is below physical form
(hsing-erh-hUa. ^^-TT. i.e., with physical form),
and is the implement whereby things are produced.
Therefore, men and things at the time of their
creation must be endowed with this li to have
their nature, and they must be endowed with this
material force to have their physical form. While
the nature and physical form are not outside of
the single body, the distinction between Tao and
ch i (/£^, instrument) is very clear and must not
be confused, 6 9
t

1
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—

Chu Hsi's idea of li ana
and

rh'-i i s
0
ch__i

ian distinction of form and
matter,

-i
similar
to Aristotel-

-i

a

i s an incorporeal

yet objective constitutive
element of any man or thing.
Li,
however, also means a true moral
principle or the totality
oi true normative principles
which ought to govern certain

kinds of human action.

He argues, for example.

Before a thing exists, there is first
its li. For
example, before there is any ruler
and minister,
there e xists already the li of the
ruler and the
minister; before there is any father
and son
there exists already the li of the
father and the
son.
It is not that originally there was
no such
li and that it is only after there were ruler and
minister, father and son that tao-li
Way
(-</
and principle, i.e., moral principle) was ,
put into them. 7^

It must be clear by now that Chu Hsi uses
li in two

different senses without making any distinction!

(1)

*Li'

designates the objective principles or laws governing the
existence and activities of men and things.

called wu-li

It may be

or principles of things (which is also

the Chinese equivalent for 'physics').

(2)

'Li'

is an eth-

ical principle that ought to govern human actions, human

relations, and the relations between men and nature.
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This double meaning of
li has its origin in
the linguistic ambiguity of the
Chinese language.
in chinese
means, in addition to principle,
reason, tao or way, nature,
proper, pattern, and right,
among other usages.
Li i„ combination with other Chinese
characters form such important
terms as physics (v^l
literally the principles of
things), rationality (li-h'sing,
a combination of li
and nature, rational nature), idea
or ideal (ir-hsianr *&#>

U

thinking based on principle or
reason)

,

moral principle (1-

right reason or righteous principle,
or tao-l^ jg {$,
which combines way and principle to
mean literally the principle of Way or Tao), Principle of Nature
(t'ien-ir

.

^ fg,

also means Principle of Heaven, i.e.,
Law of Nature) and

truth

(

chen-li , Jf

true or genuine principle).

A term so

central to his philosophy and yet so ambiguous
in ints meaning can only add confusion to a theory which
is not known
for clarity.

With explanation and qualification, 'principle'

seems to be the closest English equivalent for
1^, as used

by Chu Hsi and other Neo-Confucianists.
The question is how such a principle is known, and

whether or not Chu Hsi has successfully demonstrated that
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what is prescribed by

U

can be shown to be
objectively

true.

N ecessary and Sufficient Con H,>
i ons o£

KntwW

,,

Ac .

cording to Chu Hsi, to know li in
both descriptive and prescriptive senses one must fulfil two
conditions: (1) He must
eliminate various obstructions from
his mind so that the

mind will be in the position to know li.

(2) He must engage

in what he called "the investigation
of things.
jfa r if

knowj^.
reason

Nation

1 ’

of min d as a necessary condition to

Chu Hsi maintains that all men are endowed
with

(1 i,rj?

or li-hsing .

Vjt)

and "wisdom"

(

chih.

,

intellective faculty) which, according to him,
is "that by

which the principles of right and wrong are known."72

Al-

though all men have the natural endowments to know
li, they
are not therefore necessarily conscious or fully
conscious
of the empirical as well as moral principles of things,
just

like the possession of eyes does not entail automatic and

clear vision of visible objects.

Human minds, like human

eyes, may be obscured by various obstructions.

The main obstructions of the mind are emotions and ma-

terial or selfish desires. 73

Most of these may be put under
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the general heading of
"human desires,” which,
according to
Chu Hsi, "need not involve
indulgence in music, sex,
mate-

rial things and profit, or
extravagence in dwelling, sightseeing and travel; a slight failure
of what is in the mind
to maintain what is right
constitutes human desires. "74
To eliminate these obstructions,
Chu Hsi prescribes a

process of purifying the mind through
moral cultivation of
seriousness, sincerity, single-minded
concentration, and

above all, "the investigation of things ." 75

When this is

done, then the mind will be in a position to
know the prin-

ciples in things, for "the mind is like a mirror.

If there

is no obstruction of dust, then the original
substance [of

the mind] will naturally become clear (tzu-ming
.

will be able to reflect things that come to it ." 76

£>/£))

and

Chu

Hsi's claim is not limited to the mind's ability to accu-

rately "reflect" visible phenomena, as the following example may suggest, but extended to include its ability to "see"

clearly what is right and wrong, in a manner that seems to
bear a striking resembrance to the Thomistic "light or rea-
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once the mind is brilliantly
luminous3
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then ir
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Chu Hsi even claims that certain
moral principles will
become "self-evident" to the mind
when it is purified. He
declares,

As long as one follows the Principle
of Nature
without an iota 01 selfish idea, certain
moral
principles^ aw-Xl.rifrg#) will then become
selfevident (tzu-ming. & qa )* They are not
artificially made up by man; they are so by nature. 79

(2)
to
,

.Investigation of t hings" as a necessary condition

know li .

Chu Hsi's theory on the purification of mind

must not be considered in isolation from another necessary
condition of knowing true moral principles, namely "the in-

vestigation

oj-

things o

Unlike Lao Tzu and Wang Yang-ming

who claim that the moral sense or the innate knowledge alone
is sufficient to apprehend the true moral principles, Chu

Hsi does not claim that reason alone is sufficient to ap-

prehend these moral principles.

The true moral principles
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can be apprehended by reason
only through investigating

concrete things.

This is explicitly stated in
his commen

tary on the Great Learning, a
Confucian classic which he

helped to make a required text in
Chinese education from
fourteenth to the twentieth century!
The meaning of the expression "The
perfection
of knowledge depends upon the investigation
of
^
11
things ( ko-wu
is this:
If we wigh tQ
extend our knowledge to the utmost, we must ap proach things and exhaust (ch'iung .
i 0 e.,
,
to investigate thoroughly) their principles.
For
the intelligence of the human mind (jen-hsin
chih
) has, without exception, the ability
to know, and all things in the world without exception have their principles . It is only because
these principles are not yet exhausted that man's
knowledge is incomplete. For this reason, the
first step in the education of the adult is to
instruct the learner to approach all things in
the world on the basis of the principles he already knows, and investigate further so that he
may reach the ultimate. After he has exerted
himself in this way for a long time, he will one
day suddenly achieve a penetrating understanding
( huo-jan kuan-t'ung .^^-ffjj). Then none of the
exterior and interior the essence and the coarse
parts of the multitude of things will remain unreached, and the total substance and the great
functioning of the mind will be perfectly lumi nous (ming . ££ . clear and intelligence)* This is
called "things investigated" (wu-ko .
the
investigation of things has been done) this is
called the perfection of knowledge. 80

,^^)

,

;
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The significance of this
passage in Chu Hsi's metaethics is best summarized by
himself in his concluding remark: It "contains the essence
of comprehending goodness ." 81

Three questions .

For the purposes of this inquiry,
we

need to take up three basic questions,
(i) Chu Hsi contends that
purification of

mind is anal-

ogous to removing dust from the eyes
and mirrors, or re-

moving foreign matter from the water,
which, like the mind,
is said to be pure by nature . 82

leading.

These analogies are mis-

For, while it is possible to objectively
deter-

mine what constitutes the "dust" in the eyes or on
the mirror and the "foreign matter" in the water, there is
no ob-

jective criterion to determine what constitutes the "dust"
or the "foreign matter" of the mind.

The "dust" and the

foreign matter" of the mind refer of course not to physical matter but to "alien," "unnatural," "improper ," "cor-

rupting" or "harmful" ideas, all of which amount to morally

wrong ideas.

In Chu Hsi's terminology, these morally wrong

ideas are "human desires,”

This is unequivocally stated in

his contention that "a slight failure of what is in the mind
to maintain what is right constitutes human desires,” as
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quoted earlier.

Since men differ in their views
on what is

wight, purification of mind, i.e.

,

the removal of "human

desires," means the removal of different
ideas to men of

different moral persuasion.

It is therefore impossible to

objectively determine whether a man has
met Chu Hsi's first

necessary condition to know the true moral
principles.
(ii) More basic to Chu Hsi's central
contention is the

question whether it is possible to gain objective
moral
knowledge by what he misleadingly called "the
investigation of things.

What he means by "the investigation of

things" is not an empirical investigation, as the term
seems to suggest.

He means the apprehension by the "intel-

ligence of the human mind

of empirical and moral principles,

which, according to him, are "above physical form" and exist

within things, by approaching these things, as distinct from
Lao Tzu's method of sitting in one's own study to apprehend

Tao "without looking" or the method of the "rectification
of mind" advocated by the idealistic school of Confucianists
or meditation advocated by the Buddhist. 33

While the

jLi

to

be investigated, or more accurately, to be "penetrated" in-

clude empirical principles in some cases, Chu Hsi's primary
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emphasis is on the "penetrating
understanding" of "the right
and wrong of human affairs"
or "the li of what ought
to be"
within every thing and every
human affair.
Obviously, these moral principles
cannot be derived

from an objective investigation
of things.

I

agree with

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's criticism of
Chu Hsi's theory on "the in-

vestigation of things

that an objective investigation of

things can only yield the [empirical]
principles of things
(wi- 1%

,^-^)

in the natural world; nothing relating
to

good and evil and other valuational issues
can come out

from such an investigation. 85 (Chu Hsi's
contention must be
ate ^ from the simple form of naturalism which

holds that normative principles of politics can be
derived
from descriptive generalizations.

See Chap. Ill, B, i-iii.)

(iii) But wha t if moral contestants, who claim to
have

fulfilled Chu Hsi's necessary and sufficient conditions,

apprehended by their "wisdom" (reason) conflicting moral

principles to be true moral principles?

Chu Hsi falls back

on the theory of self-evidence as the last recourse.

Self-evidence

(

tzu-ming .

S

*>£>)

in Chinese literally

means "naturally" clear without proof or argument.

The
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character "evidence" or "clem-"
clear is* formed by
combining the
character "sun" and the character
"moon." It suggests that
something is unquestionably
clear, as if it were
under the
sun and the moon.
•?

-p

Chu Hsi, however, fails to
distinguish between selfevidence in the logical and the
psychological sense. A
statement is logically self-evident
if its denial results
in self-contradiction.
Such a proposition is analytic,
i.e.,
the predicate is contained in the
subject.

Chu Hsi did not

explicitly employ this type of argument.
Psychological self-evidence means that the
denial of
a normative principle is inconceivable
by anyone in a given

period of time.

It is difficult to imagine any basic moral

principles to be psychologically self-evident, for the
very
fact that they are discussed or defended implies
the absence
of total agreement.

There were too many Taoists, Moists,

Buddhists and other non-Confucianists in Chu Hsi's day to

prevent him from making a claim of self-evidence in this
sense.

Even if he did, it does not prove that such a moral

principle is true.

A statement is not made true by the fact

that someone claims that it is true or by the fact that it
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is accepted as self-evidence.

Chu Hsi's version of
self-evidence is a much more
moderate one. In the absence
of an established term,
his

version

of:

self-evident principle may be
called a condi-

tional self-evident principle.

It is conditional because

he claims that the moral
principles he has enumerated will

become self-evident to those, and
only to those, who have
fulfilled the necessary and sufficient
conditions to know

—

*

In theory, these moral
principles can be self-evident

to all, if they fulfill the necessary
and sufficient con-

ditions, which, in his view, all men are
capable of doing,

even though they may not actually do so.

According to Chu Hsi, all men have in themselves
his
basic moral principles.

How do we know?

“The most relia-

ble evidence," he maintains, "is to be found in
the source
of their manifestation ." 86

He asserts that

from the feeling of compassion, we necessarily
k110 ( pl-chih .A^
that there is humanity [in
^ nature]; from
man's
the feeling of shame and dislike, we necessarily know that there is justice
[in man's nature]; from the feeling of humility
and reverence, we necessarily know that there is
propriety [in man's nature]; and from the feeling
of right and wrong, we necessarily know that there
is wisdom [in man's nature].
If originally there
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were no [moral] principles
within man, how can
®ucb *nan1-£estations
without ? From what is
ted Wlth Ut » We there f°re
necessarily know
th»^K
that
there are ?[moral 1 principles
Within man.
inis cannot be false ,87

Taken together with his repeated
assertion that these
moral principles will become self-evident
to those who have
fulfilled the necessary and sufficient conditions
mentioned
earlier, it is possible to interpret the
expression ’’necessarily know” in the passage to mean that the
four moral

principles are self-evident to all of them.

It is not

clear, however, whether it must be taken to mean that
it is

self-evident in the psychological sense or in the logical
sense.

If Chu Hsi means the former, we need only point out

that the "feeling of compassion,” for example, has been

claimed to be an acquired or learned feeling and not part
of human nature, or an extension of self-love and not an ex-

pression of benevolence.

Instead of being an expression of a

true moral principle, Lao Tzu considered the feeling of com-

passion a sympton of the degeneration from the Tao, that is,
the true moral principle.

These and similar arguments are

some of the standing refutations of the contention that

.
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these moral principles are
self-evident in the psychological
sense.

How does Chu Hsi respond to those
who intuited non-Confucian moral principles? Here is an
example:

here is still a kind of people who
proclaim that
their minds are brilliantly luminous,
[accordmg to Chu Hsi] have never illuminatedbut
and seen
various affairs and things. Brilliant
luminosity
like this provides no help to the problems
in this
world. Nowadays the Buddhists proclaim that
their
minds are brilliantly luminous and yet, with regard to the rather and the son, they do not
know
what is called affection (ch
) ; and, with
regard to the ruler and the minister, they know
not what is called justice. To say that this is
brilliant luminosity is to confuse the Tao (Way)
1

Such a proclamation, of course, is not a demonstration
or proor.

The Buddhists could, and indeed did, charge that

Chu Hsi simply could not "see

11

the true moral principles

because he had not overcome his carnal desires.

Chu Hsi

draws an analogy between the Buddhist position and those who

make the claim that a river was empty without even trying to
dip their hands into water to “see" (t an-k an .^^)whether
l

their hands were cold and wet.°9

l

Chu Hsi's criticism would

have been justified, if the problem were one of determining
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whether there was water in the
river, and if so, whether
the water was warm or cold.
The question, however,
was
about what he called "the true
moral principles ." 90

And

there is no moral water into which
moral philosophers can
dip their raetaethical hands.

Chu Hsi, however, is correct in one
sense when he

as-

serts that we "necessarily know" that
there are humanity,

justice, propriety, and wisdom in man's nature.

This con

elusion follows necessarily not from self-evident
principles nor from the observable manifestations of
human

na-

ture which he described variously as the clue (tuan.
or

,

literally the tip of a thing) of man's original

substance (pen-t ¥.3^
'

or the physical form materialized

from "the principle of man's nature (hsing-chih-li

i*£)

but from certain descriptive generalizations in combination

with the following definitions!
as 'the hsin (/O

,

'humanity* means the same

"heart" which for Chu Hsi means also

"feeling") of compassion'; 'justice* is synonymous with 'the

hsin of shame and dislike'; 'propriety' is defined as 'the

hsin of humility and reverence'

;

'wisdom' is defined to mean

the same as 'the hsin of right and wrong'.

It must be
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pointed out here that Chu Hsi
is understood by many
students of Chinese philosophy to
maintain the above definitions, even though he did not
explicitly say so in his
writings, 91 The literary style of
Chinese philosophers in
the last two thousand years worked
against this type of

expression,

A typical definition in Chu Hsi's
writings and

most philosophical works in Chinese takes
the following
form:

"The heart of compassion [pause] humanity. 11

The

pause (where a correct English sentence
requires a verb but
a Chinese sentence of a good literary
style does not) is

understood variously to mean 'is' or 'means' or
'implies'.
Thus, our sample sentence is translated by Wing-tsit
Chan
as "The feeling of commiseration is what we called
human-

ity

;

by Derk Bodde as "The feeling of commiseration is

human- heartedness"; and by James Legge as "The feeling of

commiseration implies the principle of benevolence." 92 The
rirst translation makes the sentence a definition, the second a value- judgment , and the third a questionable asser-

tion of a rather ambiguous logical relationship.
Given these definitions and given the fact that men do
have these feelings in the relevant situations, Chu Hsi's
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conclusion is "necessary" in
the sense that the
conclusion
cannot be logically otherwise.
But the conclusion is
"necessary" by definition. A
different conclusion will
necessarily follow from a different
definition. For example,
given the definition that
'faintheartedness' means the same
as 'the hsin of compassion' or
'the hsin that cannot bear

to see the sufferings of others'
and given the fact that men
do have these feelings in the
relevant situations, then we

"necessarily know" that there is
'faintheartedness' (not huinanity)

in man's nature.

Chu Hsi attempts to show by his
conclusion that it is

objectively right for men to cultivate the
"hearts" or feelings specified and to practice the
principles of humanity,

justice, propriety, and wisdom.

The conclusion derived

from the other definition has an unfavorable
connotation.
It suggests that the "heart" or feeling
specified should

not be cultivated.

Logically, Chu Hsi's conclusion does

not prescribe that men ought to do one thing rather than

another »

If the terms 'humanity' and faintheartedness'

seems to have the prescriptive force of a moral directive,
it is because they are value-words with favorable and un-

,
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favorable connotations
respectively.
to the same feeling of
compassion.

Both of them refer
The only difference

between the two is a verbal
difference, that is, a difference in word rather than in content.
Neither term adds any
factual information to the descriptive
generalization that

men are capable of such feeling.
ther ’humanity

1

The speaker selects ei-

or -faintheartedness

1

to express his ap-

proval or disapproval of the feeling and
attempts to influence his listener to adopt similar attitudes
by means of
these expressions.

This, however, is to advocate a certain

moral principle by a definitional fiat, which is
analytic,
empty, and arbitrary.

To obtain the prescriptive force of a moral
directive,

Chu Hsi must prove that the feelings specified or by
defi-

nition 'humanity*,

*

justice*

objectively good or right.

'propriety* and 'wisdom' are

Chu Hsi has not proved that they

are objectively good or right.

They cannot be proved to be

objectively good or right because whether they are good or
right is a matter of subjective moral judgment.

For example,

one may affirm that all men have a feeling of compassion in
a certain situation and advocate, without self-contradic-
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tion, that all parents
ought to harden the
hearts of their
children, either as a means
to survival or success
in life
in this world of relentless
competition and national or
class hostility.
In fact, a feeling of
compassion toward
a certain kind of people has
been condemned as a "wrong"

feeling.

It is well-known that during
the relatively short

history of human civilization, countless
numbers of those

who have had a feeling of compassion
for the "enemy" or
even merely the "innocent" children of the
"enemy" of various political, religious, and moral
doctrines have been

condemned (many to death) by the "true believers"
for having such a "misguided, wrong" feeling of
compassion.

To sum up, like many rationalists in the
West, Chu
Hsi maintains that reason is the "substance"
from which all

things derive their being and the underlying
"principle"
that determines the nature of all things.

It is the giver

of the descriptive as well as moral "laws" of the
universe.

Keason is also the faculty of intuition by means of which

men apprehend the "substance," the "principle," and the descriptive as well as moral "laws."
speculation.

All of this is a sheer

Chu Hsi's rational insight has not proved
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that there are objective
moral principles in men
and things
and that his basic principles
of political ethics are
ob

jectively true.
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CHAPTER

hi

NATURALISM AS THE FOUNDATION OF
POLITICAL ETHICS
The metaethical theory of naturalism
agrees with intu-

itxonism that certain basic moral
principles can be known
to be objectively true, but denies that
they can be known
to be true by the alleged moral or
religious or rational

insight o

Naturalism in general holds that ethical
state-

ments are, or can somehow be reduced to, true
descriptive
statements and can, therefore, be shown to be true
or false
in the way ordinary factual statements can»

According to one version of naturalism, ethical judg-

ments follow from factual statements (such as the nature
or
relations of things) 0

In contrast to this version of natu-

ralism, a more sophisticated form of naturalism holds that

normative principles can be derived, not from factual state-

ments alone, but from a descriptive definition of some basic
ethical terms together with a descriptive generalization.

This form of naturalism is known as the definist theory.
Like intuitionism, it holds that ethical terms stand for
some objective properties, but interprets them as standing

for '’natural

1
'

properties.

If basic ethical terms can be
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adequately defined in descriptive
terms (e.g.
the same as 'happiness

1

)

,

,

-good' means

then the truth of an
ethical

statement can in principle be
verified by empirical method.

A>

Based on Descriptive Definitions
of Value
Hslin

Tzu

(/$)

TWmo

-

)

Among the major Chinese philosophers
concerned with
politics,

Hslin

Tzu (c. 313-238 B.C.)

,

the founder of the

naturalistic school of Confucianism, is the
only thinker
who explicitly uses definist arguments.

He maintains,

All men in the world, past and present, have
meant by 'good' uprightness, civility, peace
[and] order ( cheng 1? p'ing chlh .^ff^a and
by evil partiality, meliciousness, violence
[and] disorder ( p'ien hsien p'ei luan A&&S&S.
This is the difference between good and evil.l

The above definition of ‘good’ and 'evil' in the Chi-

nese text may be given several interpretations.

For ex-

ample, Wing-tsit Chan translates them as "true principles

and peaceful order" and "imbalance, violence, and disorder"

respectively
'good'

Burton Watson renders the definition of

as "that which is upright, reasonable, and orderly"
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and 'evil' as "that which
is prejudiced, irresponsible,
and
chaotic o'^

Regardless of which interpretation
one eventually decides to take, HsUn Tzu’s defining
characteristics of ’good’
and ’evil contain both evaluative
and descriptive terms,
1

for example, the word ’uprightness’
in the definition does

not refer to a physical posture; it refers
to the moral

correctness oi an action.

In the context of his Confucian

philosophy, "uprightness and civility" might
refer to courtesy, humility, loyalty, faithfulness,
propriety, or right-

eousness.

"Partiality and maliciousness" might refer rough-

ly to the contrary of uprightness and civility.

For exam-

ple, injuring or robbing the weak by the strong is regarded

by HsUn Tzu as violating the principles of uprightness and

civility, and according to his definition evil. 4

Similarly,

doing violence to or shouting down the few by the many is

regarded by him as violating the same principles and according to his definition objectively evil. 5

But these are

moral judgments with which non-Confucianists often disagree.
Unless the properties, in virtue of which an action or a
state of affairs is said to be good or evil, are stated in
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descriptive terms, a definition
of 'good' and ’evil'
cannot
be considered a naturalistic
definition.
In HsUn Tzu's political
philosophy, 'good' means pri-

marily "peace and order" and 'evil'
means primarily "violence and disorder." This is a
definition in descriptive
terms.

In this sense, HsUn Tzu's
definition is naturalistic.

Given this definition and given the
descriptive generalization that certain things, actions, or
states of affairs are

conducive to "peace and order" or "violence
and disorder,"
it is logical to conclude that the things,
actions, or states

of affairs specified are good or evil.

A substantial proportion of HsUn Tzu's writings

is de-

voted to the kind of descriptive generalizations just
mentioned.

he maintains that, in order to survive, men must

live in a society.

But M a society without the rules of so-

cial distinction will lead to contention.

contention, there will be disorder ." 6
are born with desires.

Why?

Where there is
Because "men

If these desires are not satisfied,

they cannot but seek some means to satisfy themselves.

If

there are no limits to their seeking, there will inevitably
be war

(

cheng . jj?

).

Where there is war, there will be dis-

8
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order. "7

Like Thomas Hobbes
(1583-1679), HsUn Tzu maintains

that similarities of human
desires and the scarcity of the
supply of things desired by various
classes of people in a

society cause war and disorder, in
the absence of adequate

political authority and appropriate rules
of social distinction.

In Hslin Tzu's words, a society is
a place in which

different classes of people live together
and
seek the same things by different methods.
They
have the same desires but different degree
of
knowledge.... Both the wise and the stupid have
the things they approved of.
But what they approved of are not the same, and here the wise
and the stupid differ.... People desire and hate
the same things.
Their desires are many, but
things are few. The scarcity of things inevitably leads to war (cheng,
struggle).
,

They differ, however, as to the means by which political order can be established.

Hobbes maintains that the

conclusion of a social contract, in which all men in a given geographical location mutually agree to give up all but
the most basic rights (e.g., the right of self-defense) and
to submit to whatever positive laws the newly-established

sovereign might enact, is the only rational way out of the
state of nature which is a state of war of all against all.
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HsUn Tzu holds that only the
strongest, wisest, and the
most discriminating men can extricate
the people (presumably most of them, if not all) from
violence and disorder
which, according to his definition, are
what "all men" have

meant by 'evil' and bring about peace and
order which are
what "all men" have meant by 'good'.

HsUn Tzu concludes

that "therefore, only these men should become
the Son of

Heaven ," 9

that is, the ruler of a society.

These strongest,

wisest, and most discriminating men are known as the
sages
in Hslln Tzu'

s

philosophy.

According to him, they are the

men who have "complete mastery of the moral principles of
human relationships ," 10

and the men who have created the

rules of proper conduct (li,ff ) and the standards of justice

)

which are indispensable means to the survival

of man and the peace and tranquility of a society . 11

For the purposes of this analysis, the main question
is:

Is it adequate to define the value terms 'good'

and

'evil' by the descriptive terms 'peace and order' and 'vio-

lence and disorder' respectively?

If this definition were

adequate, it would be self-contradictory to maintain that

something which is not conducive to peace and order is good,
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or that something which is is
evil.

It cannot be denied,

however, that there are people
who have meant by good or
evil something other than the
properties specified by Hslin

Tzu's definition.

Hedonists, for example, have maintained

that 'good' means pleasure or happiness.

It is also possi-

ble to affirm that something has one of the
properties Hslin

Tzu defined as 'good' and deny, without
self-contradiction,
that it is good.

For example, a revolutionary who denies

peace is desirable in a society he works to overthrow
is not contradicting himself.

The Doctrine of the n Rectif ication of Names .”

Hslin

Tzu

has an additional argument for his naturalistic definition,

namely the doctrine known as the "rectif ication of names
(

cheng-ming . jf % )."

This well-established literal trans-

lation designates a Confucian theory dealing with such di-

verse problems as the origin, function, meaning, logical
principles and proper uses of Chinese language.

unnecessary confusion created by the term 'name

To avoid
1

and to fo-

cus attention on the immediate issue, I shall use 'rectifi-

cation of definitions' to designate
correct definition.

Hslin

Tzu's theory of
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The word cheng in the
rectification of definitions

literally means 'correct' or 'right'
as a noun and 'to set
aright’ or 'to set straight' as a
verb. The very concept
of the rectification of definitions
implies a claim that

there are correct definitions and, hence,
that incorrect

definitions can be "rectified."
What then are the criteria of correct definitions?
Hslln

Tzu maintains that whether the meaning of a word
is

correct or not is to be determined by whether it has
the
sanction of convention, or, in the absence of a convention,
the sanction of a true king.

He asserts.

words ( ming ^ , literally means 'names*) have no
inherent correctness. The correctness is given
by convention (ytleh .^f, , agreement). When the
convention is established and the custom is formed,
they are called correct words. Those words which
are contrary to the convention are called incorrect words. Words have no inherent corresponding
substance (shih .
The substantive meanings
)»
attached to words are given by convention. When
the convention is established and the custom formed, they are called words with substantive meanings (shih-ming .^y 4 ) • There are words which are
inherently good. Words which are direct, easy to
understand, and consistent are called good words. 12
,

It is clear from this statement that Hslln Tzu recog

88

nized the arbitrariness of
stipulate definitions, at
least at the initial stage
when an expression is
first introduced. There is no inherent
contradiction
in

naming

for example, what we called
‘small' today by the symbol

large', or 'right' by the symbol
'wrong', or 'good' by
the symbol 'evil', although a
symbol too similar to others

(hence, making it difficult to
differentiate it from others)

or a symbol that will take hours
to write cannot be called
a "good word

1
'

in the sense that it is not very
practical.

Nor is there any inherent contradiction
in attaching substantive meaning (in the sense of denoting
substances or

natural properties) such as "peace and
order" or pleasure
to the word 'good', and "violence and
disorder" or pain to

the word 'evil'.

Hslln

Tzu maintains, however, that once a

word with a specific meaning becomes a usage sanctioned
by
convention, it becomes a "correct" definition.

To Hslln Tzu,

convention is a criterion of what constitutes a correct definition.
Now, if value terms such as 'good' and 'evil' have no

inherent meanings, as

Hslln

Tzu correctly maintained, then

the definition that "good means peace and order" must be
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taken as an author's own
proposal as to how he wants
to use
the word 'good'. As such,
even if everyone in a
given society (or in the world) came
to accept the definition,
the
definition itself still cannot be
said to be either correct
or incorrect.
HsUn Tzu's definition of good and
evil, however, has never attained the status
of a universal conven-

tion (either within a given society
or the world as a whole)

during any given period of time.

As we have shown, natu-

ralists disagree among themselves as to the
meaning of good.
The time of HsUn Tzu, according to his own
account,

was a time in which "the sage-kings have passed
away, the
observance of [established] definitions have become lax,
strange terms have arisen, words and their substantive
meanings have been confu6ed, and the distinction between right

and wrong has become unclear , nl 3

He was not prepared to

wait passively for the state of affairs to take its own
course and accept whatever convention might eventually
emerge.
so, a

He therefore introduced, without explicitly saying

new criterion of correct definitions, namely, the def-

initions sanctioned by a true king.

In his words,
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ShotLU a [true] king appear,
he would certainly
° ld
rd and c
new ones. This being
^
c se, lr 7?
the
reasons for having words,
]
[2]
the causes for the similarities
and differences
xn words, and [3] the
fundamental principUs of
instituting words, must be carefully
examined. 14

^te

The language of this passage
does not specifically

point out that the meanings of ethical
terms sanctioned by
a true king should be accepted as
the correct meanings.

But the laudatory term "[true] king,"
his purpose of exam-

ining these three problems in the chapter
entitled "Recti-

fication of Names," and the ensuing discussions
on these

problems leave no doubt that the meanings
sanctioned by a
true king should be accepted as the correct
meanings, espe-

cially if they were instituted according to the
principles
he laid down in the chapter entitled "Rectification
of

Names.

It is difficult to see how the approval (or disap-

proval) of a true king can change in any way the logical
status of Hslin Tzu's definition of good and evil which, as

we have shown, is not very fruitful.
I

conclude therefore that

Hslin

Tzu has not demonstrated

that his naturalistic definition of good and evil is an ad-

equate definition.
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B’

£a sed

on Empirical Ro neraHgaMnn,

In addition to the definist
theory we have discussed,

there is another type of
naturalism which holds that
moral
principles can be derived from
descriptive generalizations

without the assistance of a descriptive
definition of ethical terms.

This type of naturalism became a
dominant

school of metaethics in China in the
early twentieth cen-

tury when the new elite of Chinese
intellectuals embraced

enthusiastically the "scientific method” imported
from the
West#

This school of political thinkers claim
explicitly

that their political doctrines are true because
they are

derived from the _scientific laws of human evolution
or of
history.

The belief that normative principles can be de-

rived from empirical generalizations, however, has a long
history in Chinese political philosophy.

Part of Mencius'

metaethics represents this type of naturalism in the traditional period.

The political philosophies of Sun Yat-sen

and Mao Tse-tung provide its modern versions.
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i.

Mencius

Un ique Nature of Man and Moral Prinrip i.e

In contrast

to HsUn Tzu who defines ’human
nature' as what is given at

the time of birth and cannot be
learned or acquired by effort, Mencius means by ’human nature'

(hsing .fg

)

the inborn

nature which makes a creature a man and
distinguishes him
ir °m a11 other animals.

According to Mencius, "that where-

by man differs from animals (ch* in-shou
.^ jSV

literally

the birds and beasts) is slight," but of
great importance . 15

These unique inborn characteristics of man are
"the heart
of compassion," "the heart of shame and dislike,"
"the heart
of humility and reverence," and "the heart of right and

wrong ." 16

He maintains that all men "inherently possess" a

heart with the aforementioned dispositions; "they are not

gilded onto them from without ." 17

The following case is

said to illustrate that "all men have a heart which cannot

bear to see the sufferings of others," that is, all men have
a heart of compassion:

When men suddenly see a child about to fall into
a well, they all have a feeling of alarm and sympathy, not because they want to gain friendship

.
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with the child s parents, nor
because they seek
the praise of their neighbors
and friends, nor
because they disiike the reputation
[of inhuman!ty if they did not rescue the
child], 18
From the premise that the specified
psychological dis-

positions are the characteristics which
set man apart from
all other animals, Mencius concludes
that n a man without

the heart of compassion is not a man, a
man without the

heart of shame and dislike is not a man, a man
without the

heart of humility and reverence is not a man, and a
man

without the heart of right and wrong is not a man. "19
cordingly , he declares that Yang Chu and Mo Tzu are animals,
because

Yang advocates each man for himself; this is kingless ( wu-chlin .
& , i.e., the denial of allegiance due to the king) 0 Mo advocates universal
love; this is fatherless (wu-fu . afr 6 . i.e., the
denial of special affection due to the father)
He who is fatherless or kingless is an animal
(ch* in- shou
birds and beasts). 20
.

M

.

^

Obviously, Mencius cannot be interpreted to mean by the
above conclusion that a man cannot be called a man in the

biological sense of the word if he does not possess the psychological dispositions he has specified.

What he means by
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the above conclusion is that a
man who fails to preserve and
develop his unique inborn nature
of man is morally bad.
To

Mencius, the fact that these
psychological dispositions are
the characteristics which distinguish
a good man from a bad

man and animals entails that these
dispositions ought to be
preserved and developed.

Consequently, judgments about the

moral rectitude of actions become judgments
about whether or
not they are in harmony with the unique nature
of man, and

judgments about the morality of political institutions and
public policies become judgments about whether they are
conducive to the development of the unique nature of man.

Objections to Mencius* Naturalism *

must be criticized on three levels:

Mencius' arguments

The adequacy of his

definition or 'human nature', the validity of his assertion
of man's unique inborn characteristics, and the possibility
of deducing normative principles from factual premises.
First, to ask the question "What is the nature of man?"
is to ask what are the specifically human characteristics.

A valid answer to the question must provide

a descriptive

generalization of the characteristics which distinguish the
creature called "man" from other animals.

The nature of man
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therefore consists of those
property
pi-uperties whose presence
would
prompt men of different moral
persuasions to use the term
"man" to refer to the creature,
and whose absence would
stop
them from doing so. To answer
the question by saying
that a
man is a creature with the
psychological dispositions he
specified is certainly not an adequate
answer.

For even if

the answer were to be limited
to the area of human disposi-

tions, they are not limited to those
mentioned by Mencius.
1’he

Lr Chi (-ff ^g. Book of Rites, a
Confucian classic), for

example, lists seven inborn dispositions!

What are human feelings? They are the
seven which
men are capable of without learning joy,
anger
sorrow, rear, love, dislike, and desires.
... Man's
great desires lie in drinking eating, and [relations between] man and woman. 21
:

If these dispositions are inborn, as many
psychologists

seem to agree, then it is arbitrary to exclude them from the

definition of human nature.

It is one thing to call a crea-

ture a man because he possesses certain characteristics which
are the common features of a species, and quite another to
say that certain dispositions are good dispositions which

make a man a true man.

The former is a factual assertion and
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the latter is a value
judgment.

Mencius seems to have con-

fused the factual question
"What makes a creature a
man?"

with the moral question "What
characteristics make a man a
£ood man?"
The term 'human nature'
becomes a valuational

term

masquerading as a descriptive one
when it is used exclusively to designate what the author
himself believed to
be the characteristics of a good man.
Second, it is questionable that the
psychological dis-

positions specified by Mencius are unique
to man and inborn
in them.

It is a well-known fact that
non-human primates,

elephants, and tigers have shown a remarkable
natural dis-

position to love their own babies.

If this can be taken as

an expression of compassion, then the "heart of
compassion"
is not a unique human trait.

The dispositions to feel shame

and dislike, humility and reverence, and right and wrong ap-

pear to be unique to the human species.

But studies on var-

ious primitive societies indicate that these dispositions
are not inborn; they are acquired dispositions which men

learn from 'moral education" both at home and in school, and

from their social existence.
Finally, it is impossible to deduce moral and valuation-
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al P rincl P le s from factual
premises.

Valid logical deduc-

tion simply makes explicit what
is implicitly contained in
the premises.

Consequently, it is logically
impossible to

deduce from a factual premise or a
set of factual premises

which does not contain what ought to be
done a conclusion
which does.

Thus even if the factual assertion that
all men

have a heart of compassion were true, it
does not entail that
the heart of compassion ought to be preserved
and developed,
let alone that a specific kind of compassion
(e.g., the kind

advocated by Mencius and not the kind advocated by Mo
Tzu)

ought to be developed.

Indeed, it is not self-contradictory

to affirm that all men have a heart of compassion and
advo-

cate that, for their own good or for their nation or for the

human race as a whole, they ought to toughen their hearts to
face all kinds of challenge in this world.

This criticism

applies also to his naturalistic arguments for the cultiva-

tion of other allegedly unique inborn dispositions of man.

ii.

Sun Yat-sen

{

In contrast to Mencius' attempt to derive normative
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principles of politics from
"human nature," modern
chinese
naturalists, who embraced
enthusiastically empiricism and
some form of historicism of
the West, attempt to
derive
basic principles of political
ethics from the law of history.
As modern examples of naturalism,
I shall examine in
this and the following sections
two most representative and
most influential naturalistic
theories in the twentieth cen
tury China:
the political philosophy of Sun
Yat-sen and
that of Mao Tse-tung*
fhe basic political doctrines of Sun
Yat-sen (1866-

1925), the founding father of the Republic of China,
are

known as San Min Chu

1

or the Three Principles of the People.

In the simplest terms, these doctrines
stipulate that the

Chinese ought to struggle for the survival of the
Chinese

nation within an independent and '’democratic” nation-state
in which the people share in common all material things es-

sential to livelihood.

According to Sun Yat-sen, these

basic moral principles of politics can be derived from the

law of history which can be scientifically verified.
People’s Struggle for Survival Is the Motive Force of

History .

According to Sun Yat-sen, history follows a defi-
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nite course.

The course of history
is determined by man's
struggle for survival which
includes both spiritual
and material factors.
"People's struggle for
survival, not material forces, is the center
of gravity in history. "22

reason why all men from the
antiquity to the
n
e erted
ability
is simply be?
cause th
they a
desire to survive. And it is
because
01 mankind s struggle for
uninterrupted survival
S
le ty ha the unceasin
S evolution.
There?
fnv
ore, rt
the ,law of
social evolution is mankind's
struggle for survival. Mankind's
struggle for
survival is the cause of social
evolution. 23
i'he

Men's struggle for survival, however,
does not imply
that there are irreconcilable or
inevitable conflicts be-

tween different classes of men.

Sun Yat-sen admits that in-

terests of different classes of people
within a society do
come into conflict sometimes, but he maintains
that irrec-

oncilable conflict and class war are not
normal, but pathological phenomena of social evolution.

In his words,

Class war is not the cause of social evolution; it
is a disease developed in the course of social
evolution. The cause of the disease is man* s inability to survive, and the result of the disease
is war.
What Marx saw in his studies of social
problems was the diseases of social evolution; he
did not see the basic principle of social evolu-
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tiorio

Therefore iiarx can only
be called a social
pathologist; he cannot be
called a social physiologist.24
,

Why? Because most people
are intelligent enough
to know
that in order to survive,
they must live in a
society, and
a society survives and
"progresses through mutual
adjust-

ments of major economic
interests in the society
rather than
through the clashes of these
major economic interests."25
In
other words, a great majority
is willing to cooperate
and
adjust their relations with
others because they know it
is
to their mutual interest to
do so. 26
T he Principle of People*
s Livelihood

People's Livelihood (Min-sheng chS-i

.

/£,

.

The Principle of

V

h

ig generally

considered as "the most fundamental
principle" of Sun Yatsen's Three Principles of the People
and "the philosophical
j-oundation

of his political doctrines. 27

The fact that he

expounded his theory of history and outlined
the ideal society in his lectures on the Principle of
People's Liveli-

hood seems to justify such an interpretation.
is.

What does he mean by

to Sun Yat-sen,

The question

people's livelihood?"

According
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6
OP
S liVelih°° d) is
the livelihood
° me p'fopU
^f”the
people, the
thl existence of
society
the welfare or the nation, and
the life of the’masses.28

Clearly, the exact meaning of
"people's livelihood" is
not enhanced by this definition.
However, from his assertion that "the problem of man'
s struggle for survival
is the
same thing as the problem of
people's livelihood," 29 the

term "people's livelihood" may be
interpreted to mean the
same as people's struggle for survival
0
Sun Yat-sen maintains that people's
livelihood "is the

center

o.l

politics, the center of economics, and the
center

of all historical movements.” 30

From this descriptive gen-

eralization, he concludes that ”we must recognize
people's

livelihood as the center of social history.

And when we

have made a thorough investigation of the central problems
of people's livelihood, we shall have the solution of the

social problem." 31

In other words, scientific investigation

can lead not only to the discovery of the laws of politics,
economics, and history, but also to the "solution” of social
problem.

According to Sun Yat-sen, equalization of land and

4

„
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governmental "regulation” of
private capital are the scienti fic solutions to, or the scientific
"methods" to settle,
the social problem of people's
livelihood in China.32 The

social problem of people's livelihood
is completely solved

when a faithful implementation of these
two "solutions" ushers in a new period of communism
(kung-ch'a*

common ownership of property)

33

a4

,

literally

From this. Sun Yat-sen

concludes,

Therefore communism is the highest ideal of social reconstruction. The Principle of People's
Livelihood [which according to Sun Yat-sen, "is
communism,"] which the Kuomintang advocates is
not only the highest ideal, it is also the motive
force of society and the center of all historical
movements. 3
.

In fact. Sun Yat-sen went even further to claim that

"the true Principle of People's Livelihood," i.e., the state
in which the Principle of People's Livelihood has been car-

ried out, "is the World of Great Harmony (ta-t'ung shih -

chieh x
.

Chinese equivalence of Utopia, an ideal popu-

larized by K'ang Yu-wei) which Confucius hoped for" and is
the state in which "people not only share in common proper-

ties but also all things and powers. "35
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Sun Yat sen

s

scientific solutions to the
social prob-

lem of people's livelihood have
thus become the ideal society which ought to be realized
here in this world.
T he Principles of Nationalism
and Democracy

,

sun Yat-

sen believes that nationalism and
democracy are necessary

means to man's survival and to the
realization of the ideal
society in the twentieth century.

He argues that as long

as China is not independent, free from
foreign control, free

from "alien" domination of the Manchu
government, and free
from the ambition of powerful men who wanted
to become the
emperor, it is not only impossible to realize the
ideal society, the very survival of the Chinese people is also

threatened.
Sun Yat- sen maintains that "nationalism is that pre-

cious thing which enables a state to develop and a nation
to perpetuate its existence. "36

B'or

the rise and fall of a

nation is not determined merely by the "natural forces" but
by "a combination of natural and human forces.... Man-made

power may rival the work of nature and the work of man may
excel that of nature.

Of those man-made forces, the most

potent are political and economic forces.

They have a

.
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greater influence on the
rise and fall of a
nation than the
M
forces of nature. 37
He asserts that the
political and economic
oppressions

of foreign imperialism
"have made it impossible
for social

enterprises in China to develop
and have deprived the common people in China of their
opportunity to survive. "38 He
declares.

In view of the law
(ta°zii>i|

the way and prin*>J> ,
national survival firom the past to
the
present, if we want to save China and
to insure
the permanent existence of the
Chinese nation we
must promote Nationalism. 39

ciple^

*

According to Sun Yat-sen, nationalism is
the instrument
by which the Chinese can prevent the
destruction of their

country and the extinction of the Chinese
nation.40 National
survival, in turn, is the necessary condition
of the survival of clan and family.

43-

And the survival of clan and fami-

ly is the necessary condition of the survival of man
as an

individual
What the Chinese ought to desire is also what all men

naturally desire.

All of us are unwilling to see the extermination
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^^

T

our ^nation
t
This is the natural
thought
8
Of mankind. 42

(

~

t0 See that
suc ed *
13n ssl »-hsi ang,

^

Men' s struggle for survival
prompted them to form a society.
But a society can exist only
if there is some form
of political power to control
and manage public affairs.

Democracy, which Sun Yat-sen defined
as a system in which
"the people have the power to control
and manage the affairs
of the people, "43

human survival.

is conceived by him as an "instrument"
of

This power has been organized and
exercised

in four different forms in four different
periods of

history.

We are now in the fourth period in which
"the peo-

ple are struggling against their monarchs and
kings.... In
this period, the power of the people is steadily
increasing.

We therefore call it the period of democracy. "44
sun

Yat-sen maintains that democracy is inevitable "be-

cause with the rapid advance of civilization, people have

greatly increased their knowledge and developed a great consciousness. "45

it is an inevitable development in the evo-

lution of political system.
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iince the beginning of
human history the kind
e
emp yed in P«»Utic.
has in^vitabl v
varied a
r ln t0 th® circu
®stances and tides
of the
e age
aEe°„ . 0 |The
h world tide
thenr
racy to monarchical autocracv flowed from theoc*uuocracy, flr
and
from
monar„
chiral autocracy
_
chical
to democracy; now it
has flowed
cracy ’ and there tS
wav
to stem the
a°
tide?“6

^
<>

jL

He insists that "no human
power can thwart or hasten"

the development of democratic
ideas and democracy. 47 Democracy is inevitable.
A. Critique of Evolutionary Naturalism

.

Similar to the

economic determinism of Karl Marx which
he criticized, the

most apparent dilemma of an evolutionary
naturalist like
Sun Yat-sen is:

if all men naturally desire

of their own nation (or race)

,

the survival

even if it means the destruc-

tion of other nations, and if human power
cannot either pre-

vent or hasten the emergence of democracy in China
as Sun

Yat-sen maintained, then what is the point of advocating

nationalism and democracy?
case is false.

The factual assertion in either

There have been various kinds of interna-

tionalists who desire, not the survival of their own nation,
but the survival of a specific class of people such as the

people of the same religious faith, political conviction, or

i
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economic class.

Sun Yat-sen himself
seems to admit this

fact indirectly when
he criticises widespread
cosmopolitanism among the Chinese and
deplores the "loss of
nationalism
in China. "48 His
exhortation that

^

^

had democratic ideas, must
adopt democracy if we
wish lasting order and peace for China,
security and happiness for
the people, and to follow
the tide of the world,
mplieSj
not the inevitability, but
the possibility of
preventing or
hastening the establishment of a
"democratic" system of
government in China.
Sun Yat-sen appears to be correct
in his assertion that
all men, or at least most men
most of the time, do desire to

survive, and that human survival
requires different political

organizations in different circumstances.

But does it fol-

low that, given the conditions that
existed in China in his
days, the Chinese ought to adopt his Three
Principles of the

People if they desire to survive?

If his Three Principles

were necessary instruments of self-preservation for
each and
every Chinese, then it would be irrational for any Chinese

not to adopt these principles.

The term 'people' which he

used so often, however, is misleading.

It tends to give the

108

impression that he is talking
about the survivai or
extinction of all the Chinese.
It cannot be denied,
however,

that the political system he
urged the Chinese to overthrow
did permit many Chinese to
survive. And to bring about
his
political system by revolutionary
method necessarily requires
the sacrifice of some Chinese.
Neither is a case of the
survival or extinction of all .
In fact, the survival of an individual
does not neces-

sarily depend on the survival of his own
"nation" or clan or
family.

Many Jews, Poles, and Indians whom Sun
Yat-sen used

as examples in his argument survived and continue
to survive

without their own nation-state or ethnic nationalism.

Many

war orphans have also survived without the protection
of
their original families or clans.

Furthermore, if most men most of the time do in fact

desire their own survival, it does not follow from this that
they also desire at the same time the survival of all other

men or their own nation.

Those who desire their own sur-

vival could adopt any of the following normative positions:
(1) Any

man whose survival is threatened has the moral right

(or obligation) to seek his own survival by whatever means,
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including seeking survival
in a f oreign country>
(2) My
man whose survival is
threatened has the moral
right (or
obligation) to seek foreign
intervention to end such a
threat.
(3) Any man whose survival
is threatened has the
moral right (or obligation)
to support whatever
form of
government which will protect
his survival and national
independence, including a system
that permits slavery and
a
system that puts a substantial
proportion of its population
in concentration camps.
(4) Any man whose survival is

threatened has the moral right (or
obligation) to struggle
for the survival of the greatest
number of his own people

within an independent, democratic
nation-state even if it
requires the sacrifice of his life.
Sun Yat-sen rejects the first three
normative posi-

tions and maintains that the only "scientific
solution" to
the problem of people’s livelihood is the
fourth position,

clearly , his commitment to the moral principles of
nation-

alism and democracy leads him to reject the first three.
The survival of the nation and the preservation of democracy,

however, may be incompatible under a certain circumstance.
It is not inconceivable that under a certain circumstance
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some form of dictatorship
is the only form of
government
that can preserve the
survival of the nation.
If one is
committed to national survival,
as Sun Yat-sen was, it
will
be irrational for him to
be committed to democracy
at the
same time.

Sun Yat-sen, however, is not
simply trying to derive

from his descriptive generalizations
the normative principle
that the Chinese ought to establish
a government (of any
form) which is able and willing to
protect the bare physical

existence of the Chinese nation.

He wants to derive from

his descriptive generalizations the
normative principle that
the Chinese ought to establish a
government which is "a gov-

ernment of the people, by the people, and
for the people,
that is, a state belonging to the people,
government con-

trolled by the people, and benefits enjoyed in
common by
the people .” 50

This government ought to aim

,

not merely at

the physical survival of the people, but at "freeing
all the

people from the suffering caused by the unequal distribution
of wealth and property, and enabling them to enjoy security

and happiness .” and at realizing a state in which "the peo-

ple not only share in common properties, but also all other

Ill

things and POwers."51

Neither the fact that most
men

^

of the time desire their
own survival nor the fact
that most

men most of the time desire the
survival of their nation entails that they ought to aim at
their own or someone's or

everyone’s survival, let alone that
they ought to aim at the
happy, utopian survival of all the
Chinese people Sun Yatsen prescribed.

Indeed, a government elected by
democratic

process may decide by the majority principle
to adopt capi-

talism rather than socialism.

To insist on socialism in

such a situation implies the rejection of
democratic principles.

This is an example of advocating simultaneously

ends which are not just competing but actually
conflicting.
It is of course possible that the Chinese people,
or a ma-

jority of them, may one day subscribe to all three normative

principles and carry out their commitments.

But this even-

tuality does not prove that these normative principles are
therefore objectively true; it simply removes the irrationality of advocating incompatible goals.
Sun Yat- sen's normative doctrines are of great political significance.

The desire of self-preservation is bio-

logically instinctive.

Nationalism in the sense of national
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self-preservation and national
independence is favored more
or less universally by
all statemen and
public opinion at
the present stage of human
history, due at least in
part to
the systematic cultivation of
this mentality by every nation-state. Today almost all
politicians advocate or pay
lip service to democracy and
greater economic equality.
Indeed, a study sponsored by UNESCO
reported in 1951 that

"probably for the first time in history,
democracy is claimed as the proper ideal description of
all systems of political and social organization advocated by
influential proponentSo

1

'-^

But none of these facts make the pursuit of
these goals

objectively right or wrong.

Human beings still have a moral

choice between life and death; and death is by no means
al-

ways less desirable than life (e.g.
n1 ®

death

) .

,

''give me

freedom or

Nations have a moral choice among the fol-

lowing alternatives:

self-preservation within an independ-

ent state, merger with other nations, surrender of their in-

dependence to become satellite states, imperialistic expansion, and world government.

Democracy (regardless of how-

ever one defines it) and socialism are at best a genuine
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moral commitment of some people
in both democratic and non
democratic states.
In conclusion, it seems fair
to point
out that Sun Yat-sen'

s

philosophical framework appears to

rest upon a relatively weak foundation
of naturalism.

iiio Mao Tse-tung

PAfllectical Materialism and Political Ethics .
Like Sun

Yat-sen, Mao Tse-tung (b 0 1893), a founding
member of the

Chinese Communist Party and its chairman since
1935, also

attempts to find a scientific basis for his basic moral

principles of politics.
tains that man'

s

But unlike Sun Yat-sen who main-

struggle for survival is the motive force

of history , Mao Tse-tung holds that the development
of op-

posing forces within things themselves and between things
is the motive force of the development of the universe in

general and of the development of human history in particular.

He maintains.

According to materialistic dialectics, changes in
nature are due chiefly to the development of the
internal contradictions in nature. Changes in society are due chiefly to the development of the
internal contradictions in society, that is, the

"

)

s
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between productive forces and
' ?
the
relations
of production, the contradiction
between classes and the contradiction
between the
°
and the new; it is the development
of these
d
ns that P ushes society forward
(ch'ieni
and gives the impetus for the
£.hm ,
supersession of the old society by the
new....
It [maenal dialectics] holds that external causes
are
the condition of change and internal
causes are
the basis of change, and that external
causes become operative through internal causes. 53

^°

,

Mao Tse-tung agrees with Marx and Engels
that "these
contradictions inevitably lead to different kinds
of social

revolution in diiierent kinds of class society.

5^

Accord-

ing to Mao Tse-tung, "the contradiction between
imperialism

and the Chinese nation and the contradiction between
feu-

dalism and the great masses of the people are the basic
con
tradictions in modern Chinese society," which in the
1930*
and 1940* s, was a "colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal"
society. 55

These contradictions and their intensification

must inevitably" result in the growth of revolutionary
movements. 5(3
But what kind of social revolution?

According to Mao

Tse-tung, the nature of China's socio-economic system "decides (chlleh-ting

)" that the Chinese revolution must
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be divided into "two stages
staple 11

*

.

the new bourgeois- democratic
,

revolution and the proletarian-socialist
revolution.57

in

fact, the official translation
renders this passage to read

Clearly, it follows, from the
colonial, semicolonial and semi- feudal character of
presentday Chinese society that the Chinese
revolution
ffiust be divided into two stages.
The first step
is to change the colonial, semi-colonial
and
semi- feudal form of society into an
independent,
democratic society. The second is to carry
the
revolution forward and build a socialist
society. 58
ihe nature of China's socio-economic
system also "de-

termines (kuei-ting,^^)»» the "targets,"
"tasks"

(

j^n-wu .

mission or public duty) and "motive forces" of
the
Chinese revolution. 59

According to Mao Tse-tung, the "tar-

gets" of the Chinese revolution "are imperialism
and feudalism,

and its

main tasks are to strike at these two ene-

mies, to carry out a national revolution to overthrow for-

eign imperialist oppression and a democratic revolution to

overthrow feudal landlord oppression.
are

The poor peasants

the biggest motive force" of the Chinese revolution and

the proletariat (wu-ch'an chieh-chx

literally prop-

ertyless class) is its "basic motive force. "61

Mao Tse-tung maintains that the Chinese revolution is a
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new democratic revolution
because
n

l0n8er 3 revolution of the
old type led
0
W1
the aim of establ-ishing
a
capitalistic
apitalist society and a state
under bourgeois
ctatorship.
It belongs to the new
type of revou ion led by the proletariat
with the aim, in
stage, of establishing a
new-democratic
d 0 S tate Und6r the joint
y
dictatorship
i
of a
tbi revolutionary
classes. Thus this revofttually serves the purpose of clearing
a
Ctin
ill wider path for the
development of socialism. 62
rh

K

^

i

icW

mao Tse-tung's descriptive
generalizations of the inevitable historical development are
not intended simply as
an explanation of the past and
the present and a prediction
or the suture, they are meant to be
"the guide to action."

Like Sun Yat-sen, Mao Tse-tung believes
that basic moral

principles 01 politics can be derived from the
laws of history.

He maintains that Marxism, which he holds to
be "the

most correct, scientific and revolutionary truth, born
out
of and verified by objective reality, "63

teaches that in our approach to a problem, we
should start from objective facts, not from abstract definitions, and that we should derive
( chap- ch u ^/% , literally find out) our guiding
principles « policies and measures from an analysis
of these facts„64
,

<t
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Thus, from the descriptive
theory that contradictions

in a society inevitably lead
to a certain kind of
revolution and from the factual
generalization that the Chinese

society is a "colonial, semi-colonial
and semi-feudal" society with the basic contradictions
between imperialism and
the Chinese nation and between
feudalism and the great masses of the people, Mao Tse-tung derives
the normative prin-

ciple that the Chinese revolution ought to
be carried out
and that it ought to be carried out in
two stages, namely,

the new bourgeois-democratic revolution and the
proletarian-

socialist revolution.
Similarly, from the descriptive generalization that
there is no

ism

in the world that transcends utilitarian

considerations j in class society there can be only the util-

itarianism of this or that class,” Mao Tse-tung derives the

normative principle that "we [the writers and artists at
the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art] are [which means

ought to be] proletarian revolutionary utilitarians and take
[which means ought to take] as our point of departure the

unity of the present and future interests of the broadest
masses, who constitute over 90 per cent of the population,"
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and that " a thing is
good only when it brings
real benefit
to the masses of the
people. J, 65

AC ritique

of the Metaethics of

H^ t orical

„„

If one wants to demonstrate
that a normative principle
is
true because it can be derived
from other statements, as

Mao Tse-tung does, one must
establish that the premises involved are true and that the
inference is valid.

One of the

premises from which Mao Tse-tung
derives his normative principles is the Marxist version of
historical determinism.
Historical determinism holds that the
past, present, and future course of history is determined
by laws which cannot be

altered by human volition.

na are

reilections

'

Social and ideological phenome-

of objective material conditions. 66

It

follows that the development of the
new bourgeois-democratic

revolution

and the proletarian-socialist
revolution in Chi-

na is beyond human control.
hao Tse-tung'

s

attempt to derive normative principles

of politics from historical determinism involves
a dilemma

similar to Sun Yat-sen's attempt to derive his basic prin-

ciples of political ethics from evolutionary determinism:
he needs descriptive generalizations which are true to serve
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as his premises; but if they
were true, then it would
become

pointless to advocate the normative
principles which he attempted to deduce from the factual
premises.
Specifically,
if new democratic revolution and
socialist revolution are by

historical necessity bound to happen,
and if history has assigned the "task" (or "mission") of
these revolutions to the
Communists, as Mao Tse-tung argues, then
what is the point
of urgins ever y party member to strive
to "complete China's

bourgeois-democratic revolution (the new democratic
revolution) and to transform it into a socialist
revolution when

all the necessary conditions are ripe, "67
or to

and to

*«

win over

«.

unite, according to varying circumstances, with
all

classes and strata that can take part in the revolution"? 68
Indeed, the very act of urging the Communists to
follow the

specified courses of action presupposes that they are not

bound by historical necessity to follow them.

They can do

something else.

Another criticism can be made against any attempt to
derive normative principles of politics from historical determinism.

A logical conclusion consists merely of asser-

tions making explicit what is already contained in the prem-
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1SeS *

T ° derive the normative
conclusion that a certain

class of people (e.g.

,

the proletariat) ought
to carry out

the socialist revolution
because it is historically
inevitable, one needs a major
premise that the proletariat
ought
to bring about whatever is
historically inevitable. But

this is an absurd principle, for
it enjoins a certain people to do precisely what they are
bound by historical ne-

cessity to do.

Moral principles can be applied to
human

beings only to the extent to which they
have a choice between at least two alternative courses of
action.

Mao Tse-tung, however, has denied this
interpretation
of historical determinism on several
occasions.

He maintains

that, in the relations between the productive
forces and the

relations or production, between theory and practice,
and

between the economic base and the superstructure, "in certa in c ond i t i on s . such aspects as the relations of produc-

tion, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest them-

selves as the principal and decisive factors (tso-yung

literally function or activity)." 0

-''

.

He asserts in unequivo-

cal terms that

When the superstructure (politics, culture, etc.)

”
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obs^ucts the development of
the economic base
political and

cultural changes become
princioal
anc cecisive.
Are we going against
materialism
When we say this? No. The
reason is that while
eC08
that in the general development
of
“ferial determines the mental and
Er “ ineS SOcial consciousness,
2
we
a
al S o— and
also
anri^
we indeed
must— recognize the reaction
o_ mentai on material things,
of social consciousness on social being and of the
superstructure on
he economic base.
This does not go against materialism on the contrary, it avoids
mechanical
materialism and firmly upholds dialectical
mate-

«:
“

““

;

Some of the superstructure can
even transform them-

selves into material forces.

Mao Tse-tung asserts that

"once the correct ideas characteristics
of the advanced
class are grasped by the masses, these ideas
turn into a material force which changes society and changes
the world. 71
Indeed, a combination of correct ideas, correct
leadership,

and the availability of people is said to be capable
of per-

forming

every kind of miracle.”

According to Mao Tse-tung,

Of all things in the world, people are the most
precious. Under the leadership of the Communist
Party, as long as there are people, every kind
of miracle can be performed. ... We believe that
revolution can change everything. „ . 72

It is perhaps unfair to take the expression

” every

kind
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of miracle can be performed"
literally and argue that it
must then be possible to perform
a "miracle" to change
the
future course of history.
But the above assertions
do constitute a denial of historical
determinism which he claims
to be a scientific truth verified
by objective reality. They
reject the dichotomy of the
determinants of history into two

mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive classes:
material factor and the superstructure.

the

Mao Tse-tung main-

tains in effect that both the material
conditions and the

superstructure are the determinants of history.

The mate-

rial conditions are "principal and decisive
factors” in cer-

tain conditions; the superstructure is the
’’principal and
decisive” factor in some other situations.

They together

constitute the sufficient conditions of any historical
event.

If this modified version of ’materialism”
sounds more

plausible, it also admits that man’s deliberate choice and

action can influence the course of history.

Men are there-

fore no longer bound by historical necessity, at least ”in

certain conditions," to carry out a certain revolution.
Mao Tse-tung also maintains at one point that Marxism-

Leninism is "a weapon" to fight both foreign and domestic
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enemies. 7 3 It

’’is

the science which leads
the revolutionary

cause of the proletariat to
victory. ”74

In other words> it

is the means to the end to
which he and his followers
have

committed themselves.

Since Mao Tse-tung considers
himself

a Marxist theorist, his
assertion should also apply to
his

own theory.

If so, Mao Tse-tung is merely
making the empir

leal assertion that the course
of action he prescribed is
the means to

change a China that is politically
oppressed and
economically exploited into a China that
is politically free and economically prosperous....
to
change the China which is being kept
ignorant and
backward under the sway of the old culture
into an
enlightened and progressive China under the sway
of a new culture. 75

It is also the means to ''create the
conditions in which

classes, state power and political parties will die
out very

naturally and mankind will enter the realm of Great Harmony
(£&•* t

ung ching-i.^<:^f#r^p

that is, "a society based on

public ownership, free from class exploitation and oppression. "70

These states of affairs are what Mao Tse-tung and

his followers desired to create; he does not establish that

they are objectively desirable or good.77
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CHAPTER

IV

NON COGNITIVISM AS THE
FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL ETHICS
We have seen in the
preceding two chapters how
some

representative Chinese political
thinkers belonging to the
two schools of value-cognitivism
have attempted to demonstrate that certain basic
principles of political ethics
are inter subjectively true.

We have found that neither the

intuition! sts nor the naturalists among
them have successfully proven their case.

We shall now turn to Chinese phi-

losophers who may be classified as
value-noncognitivists.
It must be pointed out from the
outset that there are few

noncognitivists among the well-known Chinese
thinkers, and
or these few, only one (Han Fei Tzu)
is a major political

thinker.

Han Fei Tzu, however, did not work out a
system-

atic metaethical theory.

philosophy

,

Like its counterpart in Western

noncognitivism as a systematic metaethical theo-

ry has been worked out by philosophers who have had only a
secondary interest in political problems.

But, as we shall

see, these Chinese noncognitivists have not developed a

kind of logical analysis similar to the one advanced by

,
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David Hume or a form of
syntactical analysis carried out
for example, by R. M 0 Hare.

i.

Chuang Tzu

)

In many studies on Chinese
philosophy, Chuang Tzu(b 0 369

B.C.) and Lao Tzu are mentioned
together as the founders of

Taoism, and their philosophies are
classified as a kind of

’naturalism."

This classification, again, is based, not on

their metaethical positions, but on their
ethical and to a

lesser degree metaphysical views.

At the metaethical level,

Lao Tzu is an intuitionist and Chuang Tzu is a
value-noncognitivist.

Chuang Tzu, however, is better known as one of the

greatest prose writers and “mystics” in Chinese history.

According to the last chapter (which may not have been written by Chuang Tzu himself) of the book that bears his name,

Chuang Tzu is said to believe that "the world was sunk in a

muddy water and it was impossible to address it in sober
language.”!

He therefore resorted to bombastic language,

outlandish terms, unbridled fancies, and various kinds of
allegory to illuminate his theory. 2

The book contains many
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dialogues of well-known
Chinese thinkers.

These dialogues,

however, must be taken, not
as a record of actual
events,
but as expository discourses
invented by Chuang Tzu.

Moral Judgments Express Subjective
P references

.

Both

Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu advocate
a natural way of life and
a
l aissez faire government.
But unlike Lao Tzu who maintains
that the principle involved can
be proved to be objectively
true, Chuang Tzu holds that moral
judgments express subjective preferences which cannot
be either true or false.

According to Chuang Tzu, the heart
(hsin.V,' ), which
is the seat of all feelings,
"presides (ssu, f)

,

also com-

mand or arbitrate) over question of right
and wrong."3

But

unlike the proponents of the theory of
innate knowledge such
as Mencius and Wang Yang-ming who maintain
that moral judg-

ments made by the

'

'heart of right and wrong" are objectively

true, Chuang Tzu holds that judgments as to the
rightness or

wrongness of an action and goodness or badness of an object
are expressions oi subjective "preference and dislike," They

therefore cannot have inter subjective validity in the way

descriptive statements are true or false.

Like David Hume

who regards value judgments as expressions of subjective

^

6
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feeling which ‘'lies in
yourself, not in the
object, "4 Chuang
Tzu maintains that
"value (kuei
also worth, noble or
honor) lies within yourself
and it is not diminished
by external changes,"
With regard to moral
judgments he states
the same position indirectly
in the following passage:

^^

Right and wrong (shlh --fei
are what I mean
)
ee
gs
i^g;^
(eft
sentiments).
?
By a man
without feelings I mean one who
does not permit
is reference and dislike (hao-wu,*n£
to do
?
)
d a§e t0 his
foUows
n nature and does not try to artifiway of]
L the
cially add anything to life.
"

^

t

,

Jth™

ihe words 'shih-fei' have
several meanings.

In the

moral context, they mean rightness
or wrongness of an action, or to right an action in the
sense of justifying it
or to wrong an action in the sense
of condemning it.^

The

moral reelings are, of course, not restricted
to preference
and dislike.

For example, Chuang Tzu maintains that "dis-

like and desire, joy and anger, grief and
happiness— these

six are the burdens of virtue."®

Right and Wrong Cannot be Determined by Any Arbiter . If
all men agreed as to what is right and wrong, and good and

evil, then there would be no need for moral argument.

The
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problem is that, in Chuang T 2U

Ucly accepted right
own right,"®

S

words> « there 1#

^

^

in the world, and
each man rights his

He points out that some
moral philosophers

affirm as right what other
philosophers regard as wrong,
and condemn as wrong what
others uphold as right. He
says,
There are the rights and wrongs
of the Confucianists and Moists, each school
affirming as right
hat the other regards as wrong
and affirming as
wrong what the other regards
as right. 10
The question is:

Is it possible for anyone to
decide

who is objectively right or wrong?
tive answer.

Chuang Tzu gives a nega-

According to him, it is impossible "to
form

judgments of right and wrong without first
having an established [moral point of} view."U

To determine whose moral

judgment is right and whose moral judgment is wrong,
the
third party must make a moral judgment as to the
rightness
or wrongness of the action in question.

On the basis of

this judgment, the third party affirms as right the moral

judgment which is in agreement with his own and condemns as

wrong the moral judgment which is in disagreement with his
own.

Thus, like the moral judgments of the disputants, the

judgment as to the rightness or wrongness of the disputants*
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moral judgments is an expression
of an arbiter's subjective
moral preference. The agreement
of two or more subjective
moral preferences does not make
their common moral preference objectively right.

In his words,

Suppose you and I have had a [moral]
argument in
which you won and I lost [e.g.
according to a
panel or judges] are you necessarily
right and
i necessarily wrong?
Or if I won and you lost
am I necessarily right and you wrong?
Or are we
both partly (huo,^'
also probably) right and
partly wrong? 'Or are we both wholly
right or
wholly wrong? Since you and I cannot
have a mutual and common understanding [of what
is right
and wrong]
others are certain to be in the dark.
Whom shall we ask to decide which of us
is correct?
Shall we ask someone who agrees with you
to aecide?
But if he already agrees with you,
how can he decide which of us is correct? Shall
we ask someone who agrees with me? But if he
already agrees with me, how can he decide which is
correct^
ohall we ask someone who disagrees with
both of us? But if he already disagrees with
both of us, how can he decide which is correct?
Shall we ask someone who agrees with both of us
to decide?
But if he already agrees with both of
us, how can de decide which is correct? Apparently, then, neither you nor I nor anyone else
knows which is correct. 12
,

,

,

,

Infinity of Moral Criteria .

Moral judgments are not

only expressions of subjective preference, the criteria

which may be adopted by various moral agents as the yard-
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stick of what is morally
right, wrong, good, oad,
obligatory,
etc 0
are in theory infinite
in number,
Chuang Tzu asserts
that [what may be regarded
as] right is an infinity;
[what
may be regarded as] wrong
is an infinity. "13 The
same ac _
tion, therefore, may be
regarded as right and wrong
at the
same time by two moral agents
who have adopted different
moral criteria. Even the
same moral agent may regard
the
,

same action as right at one
time and wrong at another, when
he changes his moral point of
view. Chuang Tzu dramatizes

this changing moral attitude in
the following story:
,h u

Po-yu has lived for sixty years and
has
changed sixty times. There was not a
single instance in which what he affirmed as
right in the
beginning he did not in the end denounce
as wrong.
So, there is no telling whether what
he now calls
right is not what he called wrong during the
past
fifty-nine years. 14
.

The question is:

ther true or false?

Can moral criteria be said to be ei-

According to Chuang Tzu, the adoption

or a speciiic moral criterion, like the adoption of a
spe-

cific criterion of physical relations such as 'this' and
’that'

cision.

or 'great'

and 'small', is a logically arbitrary de-

A moral criterion, therefore, cannot be said to be
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either true or false.

This basic thesis is
stated in the
following obscure language:

lhere is nothing which
is not 'this' ( s hi
-4
als m® ans mora Uy right)
’
,°.
and
thiTTis
noth!
nothing
which is not 'that* (p{
)
Tl_
!
becausecfthe right that th
the
*
ng that there is' the
right
'This^VS a ! S ° r°
that , and that ia
fT
alfo ^ ls
i
Lhis has
a standard of rieht and
?
wrong, and that also
has a standard of right
and wrong. ^So, is there
really an objective"
his and that ? Or is
there really
° bjec
7 no obiective 'this' and 'that'?15
•

J

'

'

.

Chuang Tzu maintains that there
is no action which is
objectively right or wrong. There
is no object or state of
af i:airs which is objectively
good or evil.

He had the Spir-

it of the North Sea say that "from
the point of view of Tao

[that is, from Chuang Tzu'

s

point of view], things them-

selves have no value or worthlessness
(kuei-chien

means nobility and baseness)." 16

^^

,

a lso

The rightness or wrong-

ness of an action and the goodness or badness
of an object
are always relative to the subjective moral
criteria of moral

agents.

number

,

Since moral criteria are theoretically infinite in
any action may be regarded as right by one of the

moral criteria and wrong by another.

The same applies also
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to judgments as to the
goodness or badness of an
object or
a state of affairs.
He points out,

from the point of view of
preference (ch'U^
also means taste or inclination
or inti^T if
we regard a thing as good
because it is regarded
ch
someone]
then among the myriad things
in the world there is nothing
which is not good;"
if we regard a thing as bad
because it is regarded
h
S
0ne
then 31110118 the “yriad things
in thp
w^ vL there
^^ is nothing
the world
which is not bad.17
.

m

^

^

,

,

•

l

Two examples from Chuang Tzu'
his theory.

s

writings will illutrate

To those who place highest value
in life, sur-

vival under whatever condition is more
desirable than death.
But to those who value, say, freedom
more than anything else,
it is perfectly rational for them to
demand:

dom or give me death.”

"Give me free-

In a similar spirit, Chuang Tzu em-

ployed the words of an old skull in his dream
to dramatize
that death could be preferable to a certain kind
of life.

The skull, according to Chuang Tzu, was unwilling to
regain
life and return to his parents, wife, children, and neigh-

bors because

among the dead, there are no rulers above, no

subjects below, and no works of the four seasons.

Free and

unrestrained, they take heaven and earth as spring and autumn.

Even the happiness of a ruler cannot exceed our hap-

133

pinesso

to

^

There are of course people
who maintain that men
ought
take life as the basis and
use knowledge as the guide
to

calculate right and wrong. "19

agreed with such a moral principle.

there are mgny peQple

^

But what does it prove?

Chuang Tzu maintains that the
agreement among them does not
prove in any way that the moral
principle is objectively
true.

In his words,

they are like the summer cicada
and

the little dove who agreed with
each other on what they had

in common. "20

Their biological conditions and the
Umited

scope of their experience have prevented
them from under-

standing ‘'why anyone [such as a fabulous
bird of enormous
size called p.'eng (J^)] desires to travel
ninety thousand

miles to the south?” 21

The fact that they cannot understand

why some people value something which appears to be
totally
incomprehensible to them is, of course, not a valid reason
to claim that their own moral principle is objectively true*

Similarly, according to a certain moral criterion,

thief s, who are often condemned as the men without any moral

principle in a society in which property right is a basic
value, may be said to be men of high moral principle*

In
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response to the question
"Does the thief too have
Tao [i.e.,
moral principle]?" Robber
Chih says in part.

Making a wild guess on
the location of hidden
treasures within a house
is sageliness; being the
S
n t
er
C ° Urage; bein
last to
8
get out is rivht USness;
knowing
whether
or not
.
can
be done is wisdom; and
J
dividing up the
3117 18 benev0lence " No
in the
world had
CCeeded in becoming a great
robber if
i- he did not possess all
these five [virtues]. 22

fLr

^

Vf

™

The point is:

whether something is good or bad,
or

whether an action is right or wrong,
or whether a man is
virtuous or not is always relative
to the subjective moral
criteria of moral agents. The adoption
of a specific moral
criterion, however, is a matter of
subjective preference.

Moral criteria and moral judgments,
therefore, cannot be inter subjectively true or false,,

ii« Han Fei Tzu

Han Fei Tzu (d. 233 B.C„), a prince of the state of
Han, is known as the synthesizer of the three tendencies

within the "legalist school" of thought who welded together
the elements of power (shlh .^ft

)

emphasized by Shen Tao
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(Shen Tzu.^Ij., 350-275
B.C.?), statecraft (shM,#y)
emphasized by Shen Pu-hai
<***.' d. 33 7 B.C.), and law
emphasized by Kuan Chung
(sfo, d . 645 B . c>) and shang

(Kung-sun Yang or Lord

Shang,^

coherent legal theory. 23

^

,

d . 338 B . c .) t0 form ,

He and Li Ssu

d.

208 B.C.),

the first Prime Minister to the
First Emperor of the first

Empire of China, were students
of

Hsttn

Tzu, who, as mention-

ed in the preceding chapter,
was the leader of "naturalistic

Confucianism" in ancient China.

Han Fei Tzu's political

theory, which was probably shared
by Li Ssu, was believed

by many scholars to have contributed
to the unification of
China for the first time in 221 B.C.
and the dictatorship of
the Ch'in Dynasty (221-206 B.C.).

Han Fei Tzu, however,

fell a victim to an intrigue concocted
by his jealous class-

mate Li Ssu and was forced to commit suicide
in 233 B.C .24
Han Fei Tzu

s

philosophy has been characterized as Tao-

istic (i 0 e,, intuitionistic) by some scholars and
positiv-

istic (i.e 0

,

noncognitivistic) by others.

His writings do

contain statements which, if taken by themselves, appear to

justify both characterizations.

But when we consider his

philosophy as a whole, Han Fei Tzu must be classified as a
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noncognitivist*

—

'

Meanings of Tap in Han Fei Tz„

'

s

Phi 1nB „ p h

y

Llke

many political philosophers
we have considered in
this study, Han Fei Tzu, too, refers frequently
to 'tao,
a term
which, as used by various
Chinese philosophers, bears a
1

striking similarity to the term
'law of nature

political philosophy.

1

in Western

Han Fei Tzu begins the chapter
enti-

tled "The Tao of the Ruler" with
the following words,

~,.is. the beginning of the myriad things
and the
) of right and wrong .
The enlightened ruler therefore holds fast
to the beginning in order to understand the
origin of the
myriad things, and studies the criterion
in order
to know the^ clue of^good [and evil,
success] and
failure (shan-pai^c, literally good and
failure
*

or evil) *25-

-

Taken by itself, it may be interpreted to
mean a cog-

nitivist view that *tao' is the objective criterion
of right
and wrong*
Like Mencius who speaks of "the Tao of the true king"

(wang-tao

ences

,

), Han Fei Tzu,

too, makes frequent refer-

to "the tao of the ruler" (chu-tao .

jj )

.

For ex-

ample, he asserts that "the tao of the ruler of men is to

treasure tranquility and reservation*"^

He maintains at
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one point that

The sage who makes laws
in the state must [be
aCt C °ntrary t0 the
Prevailing opinion^of ft e 8e
d f ° Uow the
and virtue
iSO
(So
f/
also mean moral Principle).
*
He
who ^ows agrees with the
principle of justice
but disagrees with the custom
of the time; he
ho does not know disagrees
with the principle
of justice but agrees with
the custom of the
time.
^throughout all-under-heaven those
who
the Principle of justice wiu

A

J

“

Again, this passage may be taken
to mean that there
are certain objective principles
of justice which command
the ruler to act in a certain way
and that these principles

can be known, presumably, through
some kind of intuition.

Mencius would have subscribed to this view.
This cognitivistic interpretation, however,
is neither

consistent with the main thesis of Han Fei Tzu's
political
theory nor with the arguments in the passages from which
the
above quotations are taken 0
ists who use

tao

In contrast to value-cognitiv-

to refer to a certain moral principle

which they claim to be objectively true, Han Fei Tzu's 'tao'
refers, in the broad sense of the term, to descriptive laws
of things and human affairs, or, in the narrower sense, to

)
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the most effective
means to a given end.

This interprets-

cion is supported by his
explication of the meaning of
'tao'
in a chapter in which
Han Fei Tzu advances his
interpretations and commentaries on Lao
Tzu's doctrines. He maintains that

is that by which all things
become what they
are and is the basis of all
principles. Principles are the patterns (wen,
according to which
tings are completed, and tao
is the whys and
6 r
'^completion of all things. Therefore it is sal
that Which P uts th “8s
’
in order ^2 8

—“

'Tao*

in this broad sense comprises
all descriptive

laws of things and human affairs.
tao

In its narrower sense,

refers to various ways or roads (which
are the literal

meaning of 'tao') to a certain state of
affairs.

Han Fei

Tzu is using 'tao* in this narrower sense
when he asserts
that

1

those who follow tao and principles in their under-

taking never fail to succeed," and

those who discard tao and principles and take
arbitrary actions, though they have the honor
and power of the Son of Heaven [i.e., ruler] and
feudal lords on the one hand and possess the
wealth of I Tun, T'ao Chu and Pu Chu on the other,
will eventually lose their subjects and ruin their
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financial resources. The
masse*
who di scar d t|o and
principles lightly and°take
rbitrary actions easily do
not know their proaCt °n thGir OWn misfor
tune and

ne ss^^29

happi-

The chapter entitled "The
Tao of the Ruler" is not a
discourse on the 'way' to become a
virtuous sage-ruler, but
a discourse on the principles
and methods by which "an av-

erage ruler" or even "a mediocre
ruler" can become a suc-

cessful ruler.
li

s

T he Prince

In a language which will recall
Machiavel,

Han Fei Tzu argues that "the ruler
will

enjoy success" if he, among other things,
"treasures tran-

quility and reservation," "does not reveal
his desires,"
does not reveal his intentions," and
"discards his likes

and dislikes. "30
By a successrul ruler Han Fei Tzu meant a
ruler who

has accomplished three things 0

First, he is safe and free

from deception, manipulation and usurpation of his ministers
and subject So

Second, he has brought about and maintained

peace and order in his state.

Finally, he has built a

state which is strong enough to discourage and defend it-

self against foreign invasion.

He maintains that all of
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these can be most effectively
accomplished, not by a government of virtuous man
advocated by Confucianists
and Moists, but by a government of
law which enacts, promulgates,
and codifies a system of
laws and enforces it with
rewards
which are dependable and generous
enough to make people
think that it is profitable to
have them, honors attractive

enough to make people feel proud
to have them, punishments
inescapable and severe enough to make
people afraid of them,
and condemnations (hui,£g
) repugnant enough to make
people
feel ashamed to receive them.31

H an Fei Tzu argues that

such a system is the most dependable and
effective system

because men "desire wealth, nobility,
self-preservation, and

longevity or life," and dislike "poverty,
lowliness, death,
and untimely ending of life."32

But due to the increase of

population, there is a scarcity of the supply of goods
desired by the people. 33

In such a situation, the "two han-

dles," namely reward and punishment, become "the regulators
of lire and death, and power is the capital to master ( sheng «
*

>

literally to win or overcome) the masses."^
Similarly,

'

tao' means the road to success when he as-

serts "that the masses of the people want success but meet

)
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With failure is a result
of their ignorance of
tao and principles and their unwillingness
to ask the knowers and
listen
to the able, "35

^

The same is true when he
spegks Qf
to political order, "36
"the tao to disorder, "37
and "the
tao of self-preservation and
long life. ”38

In all these cases, Han
Fei Tzu maintains that a ruler

or a man ought to take a
specific road or follow a specific
course of action, not because it
is intrinsically good or

right to do so, but because it is
the road or the course of
action that will lead to the end
he desired.
In other words,
Han Fei Tzu's 'tao' is not a principle
of political ethics

which is objectively true but a principle
of rational action

which is useful to a man who wants to attain
certain purposes, such as self-preservation, peace and
order, or pre-

servation or political power.

According to Han Fei Tzu,

questions of rationality must be settled, not by speculative
assertion, but by empirical evidence

(ts

'

an-y en

&&£

a

39

/

Han Fei Tzu

1

s

Refutation of Cognitivism .

Han Fei Tzu

appears to maintain in a statement cited earlier that there
are certain principles of justice which can be known to be

objectively true through some sort of intuition.

Han Fei Tzu,
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however, explicitly excludes
intuition as a method to gain
reliable knowledge. He maintains
that " a prior, knowledge
consists of arbitrary conjectures
1-tu
with _
out any evidence (jdian,^,
trace or causal connection) ."40

(wW

.^^

According to Han Fei Tzu, "to affirm
with certainty
anything without corroborating evidence
is foolish, and to
use anything which cannot be affirmed
with certainty as a

proof is knavish

Taking these two quotations

together, Han Fei Tzu may be interpreted
to maintain the

position that the empirical method is the only
source of
reliable knowledge.
ories,

Since all "subtle and speculative the-

including Confucianism and Moism, assert that
basic

moral principles are true without corroborating evidence,
Han Pei Tzu declares, in rather harsh language, that
they
are

the philosophies of fools and knaves. "42

Han Fei Tzu*s view on the logic of moral judgments is

less explicit.

He states at one point that

Men, on the whole, regard each other as right if
their [matters of] acceptance and rejection are
in common, and as wrong if their [matters of] acceptance and rejection are different. Now what
the ministers commend (yil
praise) is what
«
the ruler regards as right— this is called " acceptance in common." What the ministers condemn

)
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^Isnie)

is what the ruler regard*? ao
this is called "rejection
in common." It
SVer
en heard that P e le who
°P
have their
?matt r
f?
anCe
]
r6jeCtion
oppos: :ac°h oth^!43
£Li>

wrong

^

—on

It is not clear whether
it is meant to be a factual

statement or an analysis of the
logic of moral judgments.
The statement is consistent
with Han Fei Tzu* s "economic

interpretation of history" as well as
his noncognitivism.

Taken as a descriptive generalization,
it may be interpreted
to mean that moral judgments often
reflect the economic in-

terests of moral agents and those who
have common economic

interests tend to agree with one another
in their moral
judgments.
lsm.

This is not an argument against value-cognitiv-

A value- cognitivi st may claim that some of the
moral

principles adopted by a certain economic class or social
group are demonstrably true and others demonstrably
false.
The passage may be taken to mean that moral terms such
as ’right'

and ’wrong' express speakers' moral sentiments

of approval ("acceptance" and "commendation") and disapproval

("rejection" and "condemnation")

,

respectively.

To re-

gard those who have the similar moral sentiments of approval
and disapproval as right is then simply a specific instance
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Of expressing speakers'

"acceptance" of their moral
judg-

ments.

But this in effect is to
accept or approve their
own moral sentiment.

Han Fei T zu cails all moral
principles in which 'right
wrong and other moral terms
occur "private good" (ssu1

and

or personal good) or "private
justice"

&&

(

S su-i

.

in contradistinction to "public"
good or "public jus-

tice" (kung-I
,^

^).44

implication subjective.
ly true.

" Private"

moral principles are by

They therefore cannot be objective-

"Public" good and "public justice" are not
meant

by Han Fei Tzu to be objectively good
or objectively just

either o

The term 'public' is employed by Han Fei Tzu
to

designate any moral principle which is legal.
tion between

public

The distinc-

and "private" justices, therefore, is

not between what is objectively just and what is subjectively just (there is no principle which is objectively just)

but between what is and what is not sanctioned by positive
laws*

What is legally right may, of course, be regarded as

morally wrong.

Han Fei Tzu admits this fact when he says,

The ruler makes laws and regards them as the
standard of right.
But nowadays most ministers
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th r WiSd0m - They condenm
the law as
Won! and regard their wisdom
wrong
as right. 45

f

Han Fei Tzu maintains that
"a purpose of enacting laws
and decrees is to abolish
private [moral principles]. Once
laws and decrees prevail, private
moral principles (ssu-tao
}

WiU faU -" 46

.

T he ruler ought to establish
a "gov-

ernment under law," not because he
is morally obligated to
do so, but because it is the only
dependable, effective and
therefore rational means to the ends
he desires, namely,
peace, security and independence.

Like Thomas Hobbes, Han

Fei Tzu maintains that citizens ought to
comply with all
the laws

which are "codified in books, kept in governmental

offices, and promulgated among the people, "47
ox.

regardless

whether or not they approve of them, not because
it is a

moral obligation of citizens but because it is the only
rational course of action, in view of their desire for "wealth,

nobility, self-preservation, and longevity of life" and
their desire to avoid "poverty, lowliness, death, and un-

timely ending of life" cited earlier.
In conclusion, Han Fei Tzu may be described as a polit-

ical scientist who adopted the metaethics of noncognitivism
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and devoted most of his
attention to empirical
research on
how to establish and
maintain peace and independence
under
a monarchical form of
government in an age he
characterized
as "the age of great
struggles."^ Han Fei Tzu, however,
did not develop his basic
noncognitivist arguments into a

systematic metaethical theory.

iii. The Missing Links

It will be of interest to note in
this connection that

Chinese noncognitivist s have not advanced
any argument similar to David Hume's clasical rebuttal of
value- cognitivism

that it is impossible to derive an "ought
or an ought not"

conclusion from "is" or "is not" premises.4 9 The
absence of
'

Humean argument in Chinese philosophy may be regarded
as a
consequence of linguistic practice.

For more than two thou-

sand years, the educated Chinese have regarded
omission of
the verb from a certain sentence as a correct, or even
good,

literary style.

Most philosophical works in Chinese are

full of sentences without verbs.
'is*

If sentences are without

and 'ought', it is almost impossible for a noncognitiv-

ist to discover from a syntactical analysis that a value-

)
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cognitivist has derived an

1

ought or an ought not"
conclu-

sion from "is” or "is not"
premises.

(This is not to imply

that there was no oughtsentence in the Chinese
language.
The Chinese language was
fully capable of such an
expression had the philosophers
wished to emphasize this
distinction.

This linguistic practice seems
to have hampered, too,
the development of a linguistic
philosophy which clearly

differentiates the logical behavior of
moral language from
that of descriptive language. A
language which does not

provide a striking contrast between oughtsentences and issentences in philosophical writings is not
conducive to the

development of such a philosophy.
The way Chinese philosophers deal with words
and their

meanings also tends to blur the distinction between
descrip
tive language and moral language.

What is designated as a

term or word in Western philosophy is commonly designated
as a ‘name*

(ming

)

by Chinese philosophers.

A word in

Chinese therefore carries with it a connotation which is
akin to ’in name only'.

called

’

shih

1

The meaning attached to a word is

(Wp ), which has been translated variously as
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substance', 'actuality',
sense of the word. 50

reality', or 'idea' in
the Pla-

From this linguistic usage,

most of the Chinese philosophers
who have anything to say
about words and their meanings
have come to maintain that
words stand for certain
realities or 'ideas' which
are perfectly real. According to
Confucianists, if a man has a
certain 'name' such as king,
minister, father, son, etc.,
he has the moral obligation
to live up to the 'idea' of

king ’ minister » father, son,
etc.

According to this theory,

certain moral rights and moral
obligations follow from certain 'names'. Thus, in reply to an
inquiry about government
by Luke Ching of Ch'i, Confucius
said literally, "King king,

minister minister, father father, son
son," 51

-

which means:

Let the king be a [true] king, the
minister a [true] minister, the father a [true] father, [and]
the son a [true] son.'

The first word in each case is being used
in a descriptive
sense, i.e», whoever is in fact a king, minister,
father or
son.

The second word in each case is being used in a nor-

mative sense, i.e 0

,

it rerers to the speaker's ideal king,

minister, nather, or son, or what a good king, minister, father or son ought to be.

It assumes that there is a single
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moral 'idea' of what a king,
minister, father or son
ought
to be and the moral 'idea
is objectively true
because it
1

is the "correct meaning" of
each term.

According to this

Confucian doctrine, a moral
philosopher who subscribed to
a non-Confucian moral principle
is a man who does not un-

derstand the "correct meaning" of the
terms 'king', 'miniote,.

,

father

,

son', etc., and he is so in spite
of all

evidence to the contrary.

Chinese noncognitivists, however,

have not developed a systematic
linguistic philosophy to

refute this Confucian theory.
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CHAPTER

v

CONCLUSIONS
This study began with the
question:

Is

it possible to

demonstrate that certain basic
principles of political ethics are objectively true or false,
independently of subjective moral commitments, and if
so, by what method?

Value-

cognitivists give a positive answer,
but differ among themselves as to the contents of these
principles and the methods
by

ii/hich

they are known to be true or false.

Value-noncog-

nitivists give a negative answer to the
question.

A careful

examination of the arguments advanced by
Chinese political

philosophers has inclined me to believe that
the metaethics
of cognitivism in any of its varieties
is untenable and that

value-noncognitivism is the correct metaethical theory.
By means of a careful analysis of the nature
and func-

tion of ethical judgments, value-noncognitivism strips
all

intrinsic ethical principles of the cloaks of truth and falsity, of divine sanction, of the mystery of various alleged

insights, and of the title of scientific law, and returns

them to their subjective human origin.

It affirms that all
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basic normative principles
of politics are the
subjective
moral commitments of their
advocates.
It must be reiterated
that value-cognitivists and
val-

ue-noncognitivists differ only as to
the cognitive status
of intrinsic ethical judgments.

Value-noncognitivism does

not deny the possibility of valuecommitments

,

and does not

deny that extrinsic value-judgments
are true or false. Since
there is no logical connection between
metaethical theories
and any normative political doctrine,
value-noncognitivists

maintain that men are logically free to
adopt any basic
principles of political ethics.

Of the two Chinese value-

noncognitivists considered in this study, Chuang Tzu
subscribed to the basic principles of laissez faire
government,

disapproving any governmental interference with the
natural

transformation or things.

Han Fei Tzu committed himself to

a centralized monarchical system aiming at the maintenance

of independence, peace and order by means of codified laws

enforced by generous rewards and severe punishments.

(To

advocate a form of government or to subscribe to a way of
life is not the same as claiming that the principle involved

can be proved to be objectively true.)

The history of West-
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ern political thought,
too, shows that various
combinations
have
iact been maintained.
Among intuitionists, Plato

m

considered absolute government
of the philosopher-king
to be objectively the best
form of government, and John

Locke maintained that a democratic
government which confined
itself to the protection of basic
rights was the government
_n accordance with natural law.
Among naturalists, John
Stuart Mill was not as extreme a
proponent of laissez faire
as Herbert Spencer.

Among noncognitivists, Thomas Hobbes

advocated an absolute form of government,
Bertrand Russell
supported liberal democracy, and Jean-Paul
Sartre (one of
the most influential existentialists whose
metaethical view

might be considered noncognitivist) became a
Marxist.
In this connection, it is only fair to
admit that non-

cognitivism as a metaethical theory does not provide any
moral guidance.

It cannot

because it is not a normative

theory concerned with determining and recommending
how the

law-makers and government officials ought to conduct their
public

a.c

citizens.

fairs or how men ought to act in their capacity as

Conversely, neither a frontal assault nor a snip-

ing attack on a noncognitivist

*

s

moral commitment or politi-
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cal preference constitutes
a valid refutation of
noncognitivism.

Noncognitivists and cognitivists
agree that extrinsic
value-judgments are not value- judgments
but empirical state-

ments which assert that something
is good because it is conducive to a certain end. To settle
a dispute between conflicting extrinsic value-judgments, the
parties concerned

need relevant empirical evidence.

It does not involve the

validity of the epistemological theory of
value-cognitivism
or value -noncognitivism.

honcognitivists maintain that judgments of rationalitycan, in principle, be true or false.

The question of ra-

tionality is relevant to some basic moral commitments
and
the courses of action adopted to attain basic moral
commit-

ment So

f'or

example, to commit oneself (or a government) to

an end which cannot be accomplished by whatever means available or by whatever means that can be devised according to
the available information, or to two or more mutually incom-

patible ends are instances of irrationality.

The question

of rationality also applies to the choice of a course of ac-

tion or policy in terms of value-commitments.

A choice is

o
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rational if an actor or a
government chooses a course
of action whose net expectable
outcome is at least as valuable
to
him (or the government) as any
other available alternative.
In all these cases, the
question of rationality must be
settled on the basis of empirical
evidence and logical prin-

ciples.

For this purpose, it is not
necessary to presuppose

that basic ethical principles are
objectively either true or

false

Finally

,

the arfirmation of value-noncognitivism
does

not imply the denial of the possibility
of empirical knowledge*

Empirical knowledge consists of those empirical
hy-

potheses which are verified by observational
evidence. They
are not abstract properties apprehended by various
kinds of

intuition or arbitrary definitions stipulated by moral
philosophers.

Many opponents of value-noncognitivism have found it
unsatisfactory.

They confessed that they were haunted by

the consequences, real or imaginary, of a metaethical theory

which affirms

11

self-determination

principles of political ethics.

11

on the question of basic

They found it difficult to

accept that what appears to their subjective value-feeling
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to be the most abominable
normative principle of politics

and what is subjectively
certain to them to be the
most
praiseworthy and true
are equally subjective valuecommitments, no more no less.
Some of them even appeared
to favor some form of moral
dictatorship over those who, in

W

their minds, were morally
"underdeveloped” or "misguided."

Value-noncognitivists are aware of the agony
of uncertainty which some people seem to suffer
in a world of moral
selr- determination, but they admit that
they do not have any

magic formula for them.

They hope that a better understand-

ing of the nature and function of basic
principles of political ethics will help them to face the challenge
of the un-

certainty, diversity, and conflicts of men*
ments.

s

moral commit-

Some value-noncognitivists like Chuang Tzu also
hope

that an awareness of the subjective nature of moral commit-

ments will bring about an attitude of tolerance and humility
among men, thereby making it easier for them to live together in peace.

In the light of what men have done to one an-

other in the past, it is a hope that cannot be entertained

with a great degree of certainty.
to work for it.

Apparently men will have

. .

,
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